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ABSTRACT 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 
contains a provision restricting federal courts from considering any 
authority other than holdings of the Supreme Court in determining 
whether to grant a state prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus. 
Through an empirical study of cert filings and cases decided by the 
Supreme Court, we assess this provision’s impact on the development 
of federal constitutional criminal doctrine. Before AEDPA and other 
restrictions on federal habeas corpus, lower federal courts and state 
courts contributed to doctrinal development by engaging in a 
“dialogue” (as described by Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff in a 1977 article). This dialogue served to articulate the 
broad constitutional principles set forth in Supreme Court precedent. 
AEDPA has effectively ended the conversation, because under 
AEDPA federal courts lack the power to resolve emerging constitu­
tional issues in the context of state prisoners’ federal habeas petitions. 
Now that only Supreme Court precedent can provide the basis for 
federal habeas relief under AEDPA, it is more important for open 
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212 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:211 
questions to be presented to the Supreme Court. Unless cert is sought 
and granted in cases arising out of state criminal proceedings, 
constitutional criminal doctrine may be frozen. Current certiorari 
practice is out of step with this reality. Our analysis of the procedural 
posture of criminal cases in which certiorari was granted by the 
Supreme Court over the past twelve years demonstrates that, since 
1995, the Supreme Court’s certiorari grants in criminal cases have 
been tilting away from federal prisoners’ direct appeals and towards 
state prisoners’ federal habeas and (to a lesser degree) state court 
direct appeals. Because the Court is not, as a general matter, using 
certiorari grants in state prisoners’ federal habeas cases to develop 
doctrine, it appears that certiorari from state court direct appeals is 
poised to become the primary vehicle for such development. Yet an 
empirical analysis of certiorari petitions filed in the October 2006 
Supreme Court term reveals a gap between this opportunity for 
doctrinal development and practitioners’ current certiorari-seeking 
behavior. We coded 347 “paid” certiorari petitions and a sample of 
300 in forma pauperis petitions, categorizing cases by procedural 
posture. Although certiorari grants in federal prisoners’ direct 
appeals are declining dramatically, the leading category of cert 
filings remains federal prisoners’ direct appeals. Given that there are 
far more state criminal proceedings each year than federal prosecu­
tions, we argue these trends demonstrate an opportunity to file more 
and better certiorari petitions from state criminal proceedings. We 
urge the criminal defense community to close this “cert gap,” both to 
ensure a better standard of review for individual clients and to 
promote continued development of the law. 
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214 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:211 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its passage in 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA)1 has attracted considerable attention for its 
impact on the availability of federal habeas corpus remedies for 
state prisoners. Legal scholars have written about AEDPA’s impact 
on separation of powers,2 federalism,3 and the effectiveness of the 
Great Writ.4 Empirical work also has documented AEDPA’s effects 
on habeas litigation in the federal courts.5 
We set out to understand the provision of AEDPA that prohibits 
federal habeas courts reviewing state court judgments from 
considering decisions other than those of the United States Supreme 
Court in determining whether the state court judgment adequately 
comports with federal law: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 
claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
1. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 28 U.S.C.). 
2. See Joseph M. Brunner, Negating Precedent and (Selectively) Suspending Stare 
Decisis: AEDPA and Problems for the Article III Hierarchy, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 307 (2006); 
James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of 
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Court, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998). 
3. See Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (2008); Justin 
F. Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), 82 TUL. 
L.REV. 385 (2007); Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 443 (2007); Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1): 
A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677 
(2003); Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: 
How Should AEDPA’s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 
1493 (2001); Lee B. Kovarsky, AEDPA’s (Imaginary) Purposes (2007) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/lee_kovarsky/5). 
4. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Foreward to RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S.LIEBMAN,FEDERAL 
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at v, ix-xii (5th ed. 2005); Padraic Foran, Note, 
Unreasonably Wrong: The Supreme Court’s Supremacy, the AEDPA Standard, and Carey v. 
Musladin, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 598-607 (2008) (discussing constitutional problems with 
AEDPA ranging from “habeas-specific” to separation of powers and federalism). 
5. See NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 1-3 (2007). 
       
             
            
          
           
               
               
              
          
             
          
               
                
            
             
              
        
             
          
     
        
   
       
          
        
        
       
         
          
        
           
          
         
          
         
        
       
           
        
        
         
       
2008] INITIATING A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 215 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.6 
This provision not only increases the importance of Supreme 
Court precedent—and limits the value of lower federal court 
decisions—but also greatly heightens the significance of the 
procedural vehicle in which questions are presented to the Court. 
Because AEDPA limits the Court’s ability to “break [] new ground” 
in cases arising from federal habeas petitions,7 cutting edge 
questions must be presented in petitions for a writ of certiorari from 
the judgments of state courts if federal constitutional law is to 
continue to develop in state criminal proceedings. Last term, four 
justices of the Supreme Court recognized this new reality in their 
dissent in Lawrence v. Florida.8 They wrote that the pre-AEDPA 
sentiment that “federal habeas proceedings were generally the more 
appropriate avenue for our consideration of federal constitutional 
claims” was no longer true in light of AEDPA’s “as determined by 
the Supreme Court” provision.9 “Since AEDPA,” they explained, “our 
consideration of state habeas petitions has become more pressing.”10 
We wanted to examine how this provision might affect the 
development of criminal constitutional law when superimposed on 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (emphasis added); see also David R. Row & Eric M. 
Freedman, The Effects of AEDPA on Justice, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE NEXT GENERATION 
OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH (North Carolina Academic Press, forthcoming 2008) (finding that 
success rate in capital habeas cases has fallen to approximately one-fifth of pre-AEDPA 
success rate). It is also possible under AEDPA to obtain habeas relief if the judgment was 
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding.” § 2254(d)(2). We do not concern ourselves with § 2254(d)(2) in this 
Article, but note in passing that permitting lower federal courts to correct “unreasonable” 
factual determinations of the state courts does not permit those federal courts to engage in 
doctrinal development, and thus does not mitigate AEDPA’s effect on doctrinal development, 
a central issue of our concern. We recognize the possibility, however, that there may be a 
subset of cases in which habeas relief is sought under § 2254(d)(2) but not under § 2254(d)(1), 
to which our analysis is inapplicable. Similarly, we recognize our conclusions may not apply 
to what we suspect is another narrow class of cases—those in which a habeas petitioner may 
avoid the operation of § 2254(d) altogether, because the federal claim was not “adjudicated on 
the merits in State court proceedings.” § 2254(d).
7. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000) (quotation omitted) (Stevens, J., in 
a portion of the decision joined by only three other justices) (discussing AEDPA’s “as 
determined by the Supreme Court” provision). 
8. 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1086 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
9. Id. at 1089 n.7. 
10. Id. 
     
           
           
               
             
           
          
           
              
            
            
          
      
               
               
          
            
         
            
         
        
        
        
          
        
         
       
         
         
         
      
       
         
         
          
         
         
     
        
         
        
          
216 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:211 
actual certiorari practice. To that end, we reviewed criminal cases 
decided by the Supreme Court over the last dozen terms, as well as 
certiorari petitions filed during the October 2006 term. We found 
that the Court’s certiorari-granting behavior has changed over the 
past twelve terms. Certiorari from federal prisoners’ direct appeal 
proceedings, once the dominant vehicle for criminal cases decided 
by the Court, has dropped to a third-place position behind state 
prisoners’ federal habeas cases and state prisoners’ direct appeals. 
We found practitioners’ certiorari-seeking behavior to be out of step 
with this development—despite the relative decline in certiorari 
grants in federal prisoners’ direct appeals, such cases remained the 
largest category of certiorari filings in the October 2006 term. 
Petitions from state prisoners’ direct appeals appear to be grossly 
underrepresented, considering that state prosecutions far outpace 
federal prosecutions. Petitions from state prisoners’ state post-
conviction proceedings are a relatively small category of filings;11 as 
Justice Stevens has recognized, they are rarely granted.12 Based on 
our survey, we argue that defender and pro bono resources should 
be increased (and in some situations refocused) to improve the 
number and quality of cert petitions filed from state criminal 
proceedings (both direct appeal and postconviction). 
This Article takes both doctrinal and empirical approaches. In 
Part I, we provide a doctrinal framework for understanding the 
historical importance of AEDPA’s “as determined by the Supreme 
Court” provision. In Part II, we discuss the interpretation of the 
11. There is good reason to believe that state postconviction proceedings will be an 
increasingly important arena for the development of constitutional doctrine in criminal cases. 
In its recent decision in Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008), the Supreme Court 
held state courts are not bound by federal rules regarding the non-retroactivity of new 
constitutional rules which have inhibited doctrinal development in federal courts. See infra 
notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing Teague’s non-retroactivity doctrine). Given the 
narrowing field of opportunities for doctrinal development, this is a significant development. 
A rise in cert grants from state postconviction judgments in recent years, see infra charts 
accompanying notes 147-48, may yet prove to be statistically significant, if such cases 
provided a needed opportunity for doctrinal development. Furthermore, if (as we expect), the 
Court’s federal habeas docket begins to decline, state postconviction cert petitions will 
increase in importance. See infra Part IV. 
12. 127 S. Ct. at 1084 (“As Justice Stevens has noted, ‘this Court rarely grants review at 
this stage of the litigation even when the application for state collateral relief is supported by 
arguably meritorious federal constitutional claims,’ choosing instead to wait for ‘federal 
habeas proceedings.’” (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 932 (1990) (Stevens, J., 
concurring))). 
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provision and its impact on the development of criminal constitu­
tional law. Part II.A examines Supreme Court opinions involving 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to explain how the standard has been inter­
preted and to demonstrate the remarkable break with the past 
embodied in this provision. Part II.B offers brief case studies of this 
provision’s impact on the development of constitutional doctrine. 
Part III offers an empirical attempt to place AEDPA’s “as deter­
mined by the Supreme Court” provision in context. We begin in Part 
III.A with an overview of the procedural postures of criminal cases 
decided by the Court from October Term 1995 to October Term 
2006. We continue in Part III.B with a survey of petitions for 
certiorari filed in October Term 2006 to see how practitioners are 
behaving in this new post-AEDPA climate. In Part IV, we consider 
possible explanations for the depressed cert-seeking rate for state 
prisoners in state court direct appeals and postconviction proceed­
ings, and discuss results of a survey of certiorari-seeking practice. 
We conclude by offering some recommendations to close the gap and 
ensure the continued development of criminal constitutional law. 
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
AEDPA’S “[A]S DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT”
PROVISION—THE RISE AND DECLINE OF “DIALECTICAL

FEDERALISM”
 
In 1977, Yale Professor Robert M. Cover and then-student T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff asserted that the Warren Court had instituted 
an “expanded federal writ of habeas corpus”13 as the enforcement 
mechanism for its “reforms in criminal procedure.”14 While remedial 
plans for injunctive relief had been instituted in the desegregation 
and voting rights contexts, the Warren Court revolution in con­
stitutional criminal procedure was enforced only indirectly, by an 
invigorated federal habeas.15 The Warren Court’s habeas doctrine, 
most notably Fay v. Noia,16 was intended to safeguard the opportu­
nity for “federal adjudications free from the impact of structural 
13. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus 
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1041 (1977); see Steinman, supra note 3, at 1521-23. 
14. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1036. 
15. Id. at 1039-42. 
16. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
     
       
  
  
        
  
   
  
 
       
          
          
          
          
         
      
        
      
         
         
      
          
         
         
         
          
           
          
         
         
          
    
         
       
          
        
          
         
218 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:211 
deficiencies in state criminal processes.”17 Cover and Aleinikoff 
described the structure of federal habeas under Fay as a “strategy 
of redundancy,”18 by which they meant that the state and federal 
court systems “serve[d] as a check on one another.”19 For this 
strategy to work, they wrote, the two systems had to function 
“independent[ly,] in the sense that malfunction of one [would] not 
affect the functioning of the other.”20 
Fay constructed this “strategy of redundancy” by holding that 
“state court adjudications [of constitutional criminal procedure 
issues] could not estop federal court adjudication,”21 and by permit­
ting federal habeas review of state criminal convictions unless a 
defendant had “‘deliberately bypassed’ state procedures.”22 Federal 
courts were “in an initially strong position” under the Fay regime, 
wrote Cover and Aleinikoff, because “no conviction can stand unless 
both tribunals concur, provided that the federal forum is invoked.”23 
However, they explained, “state courts ... are not helpless before 
federal power.”24 “While the state court pays a price in released 
prisoners, it can exact a price from the federal court by frustrating 
that court’s objectives in the majority of cases which will never 
eventuate in a petition for federal habeas corpus.”25 Cover and 
Aleinikoff wrote that this dynamic created “incentives for each court 
system to acknowledge and, if possible, satisfy some of the more 
reasonable demands of the other.”26 
In their article, Cover and Aleinikoff explained that this “strategy 
of redundancy” not only implemented new constitutional criminal 
procedure reforms, but also “had a significant impact on the creation 
and reliability of protection of constitutional rights.”27 “Fay permit­
ted and encouraged a dialogue between state and federal courts that 
helped define and evolve constitutional rights,” they wrote.28 In this 
17. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1042. 
18. Id. at 1044. 
19. Id. at 1042. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 1044 (quoting Fay, 372 U.S. at 438). 
23. Id. at 1052. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 1053.
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 1044. 
28. Id.
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dialogue, “state and federal courts were required both to speak and 
listen as equals.”29 The “dialogue” between state and federal courts 
had a “profound impact on the development of constitutional law” 
in “the absence of controlling Supreme Court rules.”30 
Under this “dialectical federalism” described by Cover and 
Aleinikoff, the Supreme Court might “define the values from which 
a dialogue will proceed,”31 but it would be the “ensuing dialogue” 
between lower federal courts and state courts that would have the 
“profound impact on the development of constitutional law.”32 
Examining the development of the doctrine of effective assistance of 
counsel, Cover and Aleinikoff described how, by virtue of this 
dialogue, “a significant shift in doctrine has occurred in the federal 
and state courts with no more than dicta from the Supreme Court 
to guide it.”33 
The world of state-federal court “dialogue” in the area of consti­
tutional criminal doctrine was already being cut back as Cover 
and Aleinikoff wrote in 1977.34 Cover and Aleinikoff wrote about 
different attitudes of the Supreme Court towards habeas, and ways 
in which federal habeas corpus was being restricted in the seven­
ties. For example, they discussed the Court’s 1978 decision in Stone 
v. Powell,35 virtually eliminating federal habeas relief for state 
prisoners’ Fourth Amendment claims.36 In an “epilogue” to their 
article, they acknowledged that after they completed their piece the 
Court had decided Wainwright v. Sykes,37 replacing the deliberate 
bypass rule of Fay with a procedural default rule.38 Now the Cover-
Aleinikoff “dialogue” was limited to claims that had been presented 
29. Id. at 1036. 
30. Id. at 1065. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See Steinman, supra note 3, at 1496-97 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), sanctioning de novo review of federal constitutional 
claims in state prisoners’ federal habeas cases, had occasioned criticism, most notably by 
Professor Paul M. Bator in his seminal article, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas 
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 447 (1963)). 
35. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) 
36. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1076-78, 1086-88. 
37. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
38. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1100. 
     
          
        
            
           
              
            
               
               
            
            
           
              
            
              
   
            
             
     
               
         
             
             
            
           
          
      
      
      
      
    
          
         
         
       
         
        
       
        
        
       
        
  
         
      
        
220 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:211 
first to state courts in accordance with state procedural rules, unless 
a defendant could establish “cause and prejudice” for the default.39 
In the ensuing twenty years, federal courts continued to restrict 
federal habeas as “legal conservatives became uncomfortable with 
what they saw as expansive judicial intervention in the criminal 
justice process.”40 During this period, the Supreme Court issued 
decisions invigorating the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural 
default,41 restricting the filing of “second or subsequent” habeas 
petitions,42 limiting the circumstances in which federal courts could 
grant evidentiary hearings,43 expanding deference to state courts’ 
factual findings,44 and imposing a harmless error standard in 
federal habeas.45 
Most significant here, in Teague v. Lane,46 the Court established 
a non-retroactivity doctrine, drastically restricting the application 
of “new” rules of constitutional criminal procedure in habeas 
39. Id. (quotation omitted). As Professor Larry Yackle has explained, the transition from 
Fay’s “deliberate-bypass” standard to Wainwright’s “procedural default” standard constituted 
a seismic shift in federal courts’ role reviewing state court criminal judgments. LARRY W. 
YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 192-99 (2003). Now state procedural rules had 
preclusive effect and federal courts could not look beyond a prisoner’s default to consider the 
merits of a constitutional claim. Id. at 192-94. Fay’s “deliberate-bypass” rule required a 
“‘considered choice of the petitioner,’” id. at 197 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 
(1963)), and thus “permitted prisoners to seek federal relief on the basis of claims that state 
courts found to be barred because of procedural default ascribable to defense counsel’s 
ignorance or neglect.” Id. Procedural default doctrine after Sykes was much less forgiving. 
While Fay’s “deliberate-bypass” standard “did not foreclose federal habeas corpus[] except in 
cases in which there was good reason for penalizing a failure to comply with state procedural 
rules,” Yackle writes, procedural default after Sykes barred federal habeas review “except in 
cases in which there is good reason for excusing a failure to comply with state procedural 
rules.” Id. at 199. 
40. Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 
DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1997).
41. See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 266­
68 (2006). Professor Blume summarizes the doctrinal developments preceding AEDPA, 
including, inter alia, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (abandoning Fay’s doctrine of 
“deliberate bypass” in favor of rule that prisoner must demonstrate “cause and prejudice” to 
excuse procedural default); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 522 (1982) (establishing “total 
exhaustion” rule requiring courts to dismiss “mixed” petitions containing both exhausted and 
unexhausted claims); and Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995).
42. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). 
43. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992). 
44. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981). 
45. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
46. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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proceedings.47 Under Teague, unless a prisoner fits within certain 
narrow exceptions, he or she:
[M]ay not seek to enforce a “new rule” of law in federal habeas 
corpus proceedings if the new rule was announced after the 
petitioner’s conviction became “final” or if the petitioner is 
seeking to establish a wholly new rule or to apply a settled 
precedent in a novel way that would result in the creation of a 
new rule.48 
The Teague rule “has profoundly changed the law of habeas 
corpus and narrowed the range of relief that is available in habeas 
corpus proceedings.”49 As we discuss below,50 Congress codified and 
expanded Teague in the “as determined by the Supreme Court” 
provision of AEDPA.51 We now turn to that radical restriction on 
habeas relief. 
II. AEDPA’S “AS DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT”
PROVISION—THE END OF “DIALECTICAL FEDERALISM” AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The constriction of federal habeas reached a new extreme in 
AEDPA.52 AEDPA restricts federal habeas relief for state prisoners 
in a number of ways. The provision with which we are con­
cerned—and which we claim has a significant impact on the 
development of federal constitutional law—bars federal district 
courts from granting a state prisoner’s habeas petition unless the 
state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”53 
47. Id. at 316. 
48. RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 1138 (5th ed. 2005) (citations omitted). 
49. Id. at 1137-38. 
50. See infra Part II.A. 
51. See also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 48, at 1137-38. 
52. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 40, at 4-12 (explaining the slow restriction of habeas 
relief under Supreme Court jurisprudence that culminated with Congress’ passage of 
AEDPA). 
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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Upon signing AEDPA into law, President Clinton specifically 
commented on the “as determined by the Supreme Court” 
provision.54 “Some have suggested,” President Clinton wrote, “that 
this provision will limit the authority of the Federal courts to bring 
their own independent judgment to bear” in habeas cases.55 Citing 
no less an authority than Marbury v. Madison,56 President Clinton 
wrote that he expected the courts to construe AEDPA to avoid the 
constitutional problems that would accompany a law purporting to 
“preclude the Federal courts from making an independent determi­
nation about ‘what the law is.’”57 Thus, President Clinton implied 
that the “as determined by the Supreme Court” provision of AEDPA 
would be harmonized with prior habeas practice, and would work no 
significant change on federal habeas corpus. 
A. AEDPA and the End of “Dialectical Federalism” 
President Clinton’s signing statement has been dismissed as 
nothing more than “lip service to meaningful federal court review of 
state court convictions.”58 Nonetheless, the constitutional argument 
(the substantive merits of which are beyond the scope of this Article) 
54. Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 630 (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter Signing Statement]. 
55. Id. at 631. 
56. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
57. Signing Statement, supra note 54, at 631. 
58. Blume, supra note 41, at 259. Professor Blume, like Professors Tushnet and Yackle, 
advances the argument that AEDPA did not enact sweeping changes, as the Supreme Court 
“had already significantly curtailed the writ of habeas corpus” through judicial decisions. Id. 
at 262. Cf. Ides, supra note 3, at 684 (“This focus on Supreme Court precedent can be seen as 
a major revision of the law of habeas. It effectively reins in circuit courts that may have a 
proclivity to expand the rights of habeas petitioners and leaves the development of the law 
in this context solely in the hands of the Supreme Court. Experimentation by the lower courts 
is, in essence, forbidden.”); Brief for Marvin E. Frankel et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 25, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (No. 98-8384) (“The ‘clearly 
established by Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court’ clause of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1) works a substantial change from previous law ....”). 
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has been advanced in litigation59 and by commentators,60 and 
remains to be confronted directly by the Supreme Court.61 The Court 
has construed the “as determined by the Supreme Court” provision 
of AEDPA—but not in a manner that suggests receptiveness to the 
constitutional concerns to which President Clinton alluded.62 
In Williams v. Taylor, all members of the Court agreed that 
“clearly established Federal law” under AEDPA includes only 
decisions of the Supreme Court.63 In this respect, all concurred, 
AEDPA goes further than prior Supreme Court non-retroactivity 
precedent in Teague.64 Under this interpretation, AEDPA is more 
59. See Crater v. Galaza, 508 F.3d 1261, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc); Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 667-68 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(Noonan, J., concurring); Foley v. Parker, 481 F.3d 380, 399 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Davis v. Straub, 430 F.3d 281, 296-98 (6th Cir. 
2005) (Merritt, J., dissenting); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869-70 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d on 
other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 
60. See, e.g., Liebman & Ryan, supra note 2, at 868-84 (arguing that interpretations of § 
2254(d)(1) by the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits were unconstitutional). 
61. Although the Court has declined to grant certiorari to decide the constitutionality of 
the “clearly established federal law” clause, see, e.g., Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 874-75 
(4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1090 (1999) (rejecting Article III challenge to 
§ 2254(d)(1)), the most that can be said is that the Court “probably” deems the clause to be 
constitutional. Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 671 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fernandez, J., concurring). 
Indeed, many questions about AEDPA’s provisions remain unresolved over a decade after its 
passage. See Marceau, supra note 3, at 387 (“[A]lthough AEDPA is now over a decade old, 
courts, commentators, and practitioners all continue to struggle to make sense of the Act’s key 
provisions dealing with questions of fact in federal habeas proceedings.”). 
62. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57. 
63. 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000). Compare id., with id. at 412-13 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part). Amici Marvin E. Frankel, James K. Logan, Lawrence W. Pierce, George C. Pratt, and 
Harold R. Tyler (retired Article III judges) urged the Court to refrain from interpreting the 
“as determined by the Supreme Court” clause of § 2254(d)(1) to avoid constitutional questions 
not squarely presented. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 58, at 25. The Court did not 
refrain from interpreting the clause, but neither did the Court explicitly address its 
constitutionality. 
64. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, 
new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have 
become final before the new rules are announced.”). Prior to AEDPA’s enactment, some 
commentators warned that Teague itself would “largely eliminate[] habeas corpus as a 
mechanism for the development of federal law.” YACKLE, supra note 39, at 87; see also James 
S. Liebman, More Than “Slightly Retro:” The Rehnquist Court’s Rout of Habeas Corpus 
Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537, 575 (1990-1991) 
(criticizing the Teague plurality’s suggestion that retroactivity question should be resolved 
before the merits on the grounds that “the plurality approach would forbid lower federal 
judges from interpreting the United States Constitution in habeas corpus cases and would 
relegate those judges to the nearly ministerial task of putting into operation decisions that 
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than a mere codification of judge-made rules (as some have 
argued)65—it is a radical extension of Supreme Court habeas 
doctrine.66 There appears to be little room left for lower federal 
courts to “mak[e] an independent determination about ‘what the law 
is,’” as President Clinton had suggested.67 
This is particularly so given Justice O’Connor’s gloss on the “as 
determined by the Supreme Court” provision.68 “That statutory 
phrase refers to the holdings,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “as opposed 
to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant 
state-court decision.”69 
Although Justice O’Connor was writing for a bare 5-4 majority in 
Williams, it appears her formulation is now settled law.70 Concur­
ring in Carey v. Musladin,71 Justice Stevens was alone in criticizing 
the notion that “clearly established Federal law” is restricted to 
Supreme Court holdings, excluding dicta.72 He described this 
the Supreme Court renders on direct review”). Section 2254(d)(1) realizes these fears. It not 
only codifies but extends Teague, explicitly restricting “clearly established Federal law” to 
decisions of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000). 
65. A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New Rules” and the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 23 (2002) (“Williams stands for the 
proposition that AEDPA codified the antiretroactivity principle of Teague.”); Tushnet & 
Yackle, supra note 40, at 42 (“Specifically, we think courts will read this crucial new provision 
essentially to codify the Teague doctrine as articulated by Justice O'Connor.”). But see Horn 
v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 271 (2002) (per curiam) (describing the analyses under Teague and 
§ 2254(d)(1) as “distinct,” insofar as the Teague retroactivity test must be conducted as a 
“threshold” analysis before the AEDPA standard of review is applied). 
66. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 48, at 1580 § 32.3 (stating that “section 2254(d)(1) 
establishes a strict choice-of-law rule that is analogous to, but considerably stricter than, the 
rule of Teague v. Lane”). 
67. Signing Statement, supra note 54, at 631; see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying 
text. See generally Liebman & Ryan, supra note 2, at 767-68 (discussing four ways in which 
AEDPA “accords more respect to state court finality than did Teague”). 
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
69. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (O’Connor, J., concurring in split majority opinion). 
70. It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine how faithful the Court has been to 
Justice O’Connor’s formulation. In Panetti v. Quarterman, a 5-4 majority of the Court found 
“clearly established Federal law” in Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2855-56 (2007). The four dissenting Justices 
found this “tenuous.” Id. at 2867 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, one might 
question whether distilling the “gross disproportionality principle” from the Court’s prior 
holdings—as the Court did in confronting an Eighth Amendment challenge to California’s 
“three-strikes” law in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)—was a reading of only the 
“holdings” as opposed to “dicta” of prior cases. 
71. 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006). 
72. Id. at 655-56 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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formulation as “Justice O’Connor’s dictum about dicta,”73 and 
argued that restricting “clearly established Federal law as deter­
mined by the Supreme Court” to the Court’s holdings alone deprived 
lower courts of guidance. “Virtually every one of the Court’s opinions 
announcing a new application of a constitutional principle contains 
some explanatory language that is intended to provide guidance to 
lawyers and judges in future cases.”74 Justice Stevens wrote that it 
was wrong to encourage state courts to devalue the Supreme Court’s 
guidance.75 He concluded, “[t]he text of AEDPA itself provides 
sufficient obstacles to obtaining habeas relief without placing a 
judicial thumb on the warden’s side of the scales.”76 
Certainly, Justice Stevens is right to say that the “as determined 
by the Supreme Court” provision, construed to mean “holdings” as 
opposed to “dicta,” sets a high bar. For a state court’s opinion to 
merit deference under AEDPA, it need not cite—nor even be aware 
of—Supreme Court precedents, so long as “neither the reasoning nor 
the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”77 The 
presence of a circuit split may reflect a “lack of guidance” by the 
Supreme Court,78 and reinforce the conclusion that federal law is 
not “clearly established.”79 
Carey v. Musladin, a case from the Court’s October 2006 Term, 
illustrates the impact of the provision.80 Musladin involved the issue 
of whether the presence in the courtroom of spectators wearing 
buttons with pictures of a murder victim deprived the defendant of 
a fair trial.81 Although Supreme Court precedent established that 
courtroom practices might give rise to “inherent prejudice,” the 
Court had applied this test only in cases involving state-sponsored 
conduct, not in cases involving “private-actor courtroom conduct.”82 
73. Id. at 655. 
74. Id. 
75. Id.
76. Id. 
77. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003) (per curiam); see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 
U.S. 12, 16 (2003) (per curiam). 
78. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 654 (majority opinion). 
79. Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005) (per curiam). 
80. 127 S. Ct. at 654. 
81. Id. at 651-52. 
82. Id. at 653-54. 
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This factual variance spelled doom for Musladin’s chance of 
obtaining habeas relief.83 “Given the lack of holdings from this Court 
regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators’ courtroom 
conduct of the kind involved here,” the Court wrote, “it cannot be 
said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established 
Federal law” in denying relief.84 The Court’s opinion concluded only 
that there was no “clearly established Federal law” about the impact 
of spectator conduct in the courtroom, and contributed nothing to 
the development of the constitutional doctrine at stake.
The Court’s analysis in Musladin highlights the paradoxical 
nature of review of federal constitutional questions under AEDPA.85 
In deciding that the state court’s ruling was not “contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,” the 
Court pointed to the fact that the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal were 
split on the proper standard for judging spectator conduct.86 The 
presence of a circuit split, the Musladin majority reasoned, sup­
ported its conclusion that the law in this area was not “clearly 
established”:87 if there were governing Supreme Court precedents on 
83. Padraic Foran has written about Musladin, arguing that “Musladin serves to 
underline the AEDPA’s gnawing premise that in novel fact patterns even the most shocking 
injustice will never be federally resolved.” Foran, supra note 4, at 606-07. Foran also makes 
the good point that certain constitutional violations that would qualify for retroactive 
application of “watershed” rules under the Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane, 498 
U.S. 288 (1989), would not qualify for relief under § 2254(d)(1)—“no matter how unfair the 
conviction”—if Supreme Court case law was not “contrary to federal law at the time.” Id. at 
612. 
84. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 654 (quotation omitted). 
85. After Musladin, the Court granted cert in several cases, vacated the judgments below, 
and remanded for consideration in light of its Musladin decision. See Hudson v. Spisak, 128 
S. Ct. 373 (2007) (claimed Eighth Amendment violation resulting from jury instructions 
regarding capital sentencing verdicts); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 127 S. Ct. 1247 (2007) (claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from withdrawal of insanity defense on morning 
of trial); Patrick v. Smith, 127 S. Ct. 2126 (2007) (claim of insufficiency of the evidence in 
shaken-baby case based on expert testimony); Miller v. Rodriguez, 127 S. Ct. 1119 (2007) 
(claim of denial of right to public trial stemming from exclusion of defendant’s family members 
from courtroom); Schmidt v. Van Patten, 127 S. Ct. 1120 (2007) (claim of denial of right to 
counsel by virtue of counsel’s appearance telephonically rather than in person). Two of those 
cases have returned to the Supreme Court’s docket. Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S. Ct. 743 
(2008); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 128 S. Ct 2996 (2008) (granting certiorari to consider, inter 
alia, whether the Ninth Circuit exceed its authority by granting habeas relief “despite the 
absence of a Supreme Court decision addressing the point”); see also infra note 92 (discussing 
Wright v. Van Patten). 
86. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 654. 
87. Id. We do not mean to suggest that Musladin conclusively determined that the 
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point, there would be no room for disagreement. When occurring 
outside of the AEDPA context, the presence of a jurisdictional split 
increases the likelihood that the Court will grant certiorari and 
resolve the question,88 but in § 2254 federal habeas cases, a 
jurisdictional split means the Supreme Court will not reach the 
merits. 
As construed in Musladin, AEDPA’s “as determined by the 
Supreme Court” provision clearly sets the final nail in the coffin of 
the “dialectical federalism” described by Cover and Aleinikoff. If 
lower federal courts are instructed to measure the state-court 
judgment at issue against only the holdings of the Supreme Court, 
and are not permitted to have a role in amplifying Supreme Court 
doctrine, state and federal courts are no longer “required both to 
speak and listen as equals,”89 or to attend to one another’s views 
with “mutual respect and awareness.”90 The conversation is now 
one-sided. Federal courts must defer to state courts’ resolution of 
federal constitutional issues in state prisoners’ federal habeas 
cases, 91 unless the state court determination is clearly out of bounds 
under the terms delineated by AEDPA.92 
presence of a circuit split necessarily means that the law is not “clearly established” for all 
purposes and in all circumstances. Indeed, we do not mean to suggest that there is no room 
for further litigation about the exact parameters of AEDPA. Our discussion in this Article is 
in many ways premised on a “worst-case scenario” of AEDPA interpretation. 
88. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: 
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 407 
(2004) (“[E]ven allegations of a conflict between lower court decisions, where actual conflict 
is absent, increase the likelihood that the Court will grant certiorari.”). 
89. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1036. 
90. Id. at 1048. 
91. Professor Yackle has written that the true purpose of § 2254(d) “may be only to remind 
inferior federal courts that state courts are their co-equals in a single system, that state 
courts do not answer to federal district and circuit courts, and that both state and inferior 
federal courts do answer only to the Supreme Court.” YACKLE, supra note 39, at 108. While 
it is true that both state and federal courts are sibling courts under AEDPA, they are now 
parallel tracks that are not forced to engage in individual prisoners’ cases—not the system 
of “redundancy” that Cover and Aleinikoff described. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 
1042.
92. For example, in Wright v. Van Patten, the Supreme Court applied Musladin to reverse 
the Seventh Circuit, concluding the state court’s determination that a defendant’s federal 
constitutional rights were not violated when his attorney appeared by speaker phone at the 
plea hearing was not “‘contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law.’” 128 S. Ct. 743, 746 (2008) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens wrote, “I emphasize that today’s opinion does 
not say that the state courts’ interpretation of Cronic was correct, or that we would have 
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A lower court decision in the aftermath of Musladin dramatizes 
this lack of reciprocal comity. Emboldened by the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements in Musladin, the Washington Supreme Court dis­
missed Ninth Circuit case law as “neither controlling nor persua­
sive.”93 “The Washington State Supreme Court has the same duty 
and authority as a federal circuit court to apply the United States 
Constitution and United States Supreme Court opinions in criminal 
matters,” it wrote.94 Thus, AEDPA allows “state appellate courts to 
determine and follow their own constitutional precedent” where no 
clear rule has been established by Supreme Court holdings,95 and to 
dismiss lower federal courts’ decisions as irrelevant.96 
B. The Future of Doctrinal Development After AEDPA 
AEDPA also freezes the development of doctrine by forbidding 
lower courts from relying on and developing Supreme Court 
teaching. It is no longer permissible, as Cover and Aleinikoff 
described in 1977, for “a significant shift in doctrine [to occur] in the 
federal and state courts with no more than dicta from the Supreme 
Court to guide it.”97 The lower courts are not permitted to work 
forward from the Supreme Court’s general pronouncements of 
constitutional principle—at least not in the vehicle of federal 
habeas.98 
accepted that reading if the case had come to us on direct review rather than by way of 28 
U.S.C. § 2254.” 128 S. Ct. at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
93. State v. Lord, 165 P.3d 1251, 1257 (Wash. 2007) (emphasis added). 
94. Id. (emphasis added). 
95. Id.; see also State v. White, 129 P.3d 1107, 1109 n.4 (Haw. 2006) (continuing to rely 
on prior Hawaii Supreme Court precedent although federal district court’s grant of habeas 
relief had been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on the grounds that the Hawaii case was 
“contrary to, and involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the United States Supreme Court”). 
96. Of course, lower federal court opinions in § 2254 cases were never binding precedent 
for state courts in subsequent cases. But prior to AEDPA, state courts would have wanted to 
study federal opinions to reduce the likelihood that a conviction would be reversed in federal 
habeas proceedings. After AEDPA, state courts can now disregard lower federal courts’ 
interpretation of federal law with impunity. In this way, AEDPA has conclusively ruptured 
the dialogue between state and federal courts described by Cover and Aleinikoff. Cover & 
Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1044. 
97. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1065. 
98. In 2001, Professor Adam Steinman, in an article advocating that federal courts accord 
state courts “opinion deference” rather than “result deference” under § 2254(d)(1), identified 
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Federal judges have recognized this doctrinal stall.99 In an early 
articulation of the constitutional arguments against § 2254(d)(1), 
Judge Kenneth F. Ripple of the Seventh Circuit expressed the 
argument in terms which explicitly emphasized the role of the lower 
federal courts in developing constitutional doctrine. “The relation­
ship and interreaction of the various levels of the judiciary in 
molding constitutional doctrine is the product of a carefully crafted 
balance of power between the judiciary and the legislative branch,” 
he wrote.100 And while “Congress certainly can influence the 
development of the constitutional doctrine,” Judge Ripple allowed, 
only the Supreme Court may “determine[] the degree to which the 
lower courts ought to be permitted to engage in constitutional 
doctrinal development.”101 Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. of the Ninth 
Circuit similarly has written that under AEDPA, “[t]he development 
of doctrine is despised.”102 Two judges of the First Circuit recently 
noted that “[w]ith the congressionally dictated reliance on Supreme 
Court precedent, [the] large body of constitutional law developed by 
the lower federal courts becomes largely irrelevant.”103 
as a “remaining ... thorny” issue the question of whether district courts should address state 
prisoners’ constitutional claims before considering whether § 2254(d)(1) permits relief. 
Steinman, supra note 3, at 1535-36. Also invoking Cover and Aleinikoff’s concept of “dialogue,” 
he urged that district courts first consider the merits of the claim and then whether AEDPA 
allows relief. Id. (“[I]f federal habeas courts routinely uphold state court convictions because 
they are supported by reasonable state court opinions, without ever addressing the legal 
issues independently, then federal habeas courts will have no part in the ‘dialogue’ over 
federal rights.”); see also Ides, supra note 3, at 684 (arguing that under § 2254(d)(1) 
“[e]xperimentation by the lower courts is, in essence, forbidden”). 
99. Of course, not all members of the judiciary are concerned about this phenomenon. 
Some see AEDPA’s restrictions as a convenient way to dispose of habeas cases. See Kovarsky, 
supra note 3, at 507 (“‘Comity, finality, and federalism’ is now the favored idiom for 
erroneously invoking a legislative mood; it has become the means by which courts express an 
illegitimate hostility towards exacting standards of criminal procedure.”). 
100. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 886 (7th Cir. 1996) (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. at 887. 
102. Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (Noonan, J., concurring) (“In our 
system of law where precedent prevails and is developed, AEDPA denies the judge the use of 
circuit precedent, [and] denies the development of Supreme Court and circuit precedent .... 
The development of doctrine is despised. That despisal is a direct legislative interference in 
the independence of the judiciary.”); see also Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the 
Law Is: How Certain Legal Doctrines Impede the Development of Constitutional Law and What 
Courts Can Do About It, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 87, 90-93 (2007) (describing how AEDPA “thwarts 
the development of constitutional law”). 
103. Evans v. Thompson, 524 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lipez & Torruella, JJ., dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
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Lockyer v. Andrade104 provides an example of how the develop­
ment of doctrine is slowed.105 In Lockyer, the Supreme Court 
disposed of an Eighth Amendment challenge to California’s “three 
strikes” law. The Court examined the “thicket of [its] Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence” and identified one principle that 
emerged as “clearly established”—“[a] gross disproportionality 
principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years.”106 However, 
the Court concluded that its precedent “exhibit[ed] a lack of clarity” 
with respect to this “gross disproportionality principle,” such that 
the “precise contours” of that principle “are unclear.”107 
Before AEDPA, the Supreme Court’s pronouncement of broad 
constitutional principles, like the “gross disproportionality principle” 
described in Lockyer, could be articulated on a case-by-case basis by 
the lower courts—state and federal—engaging in the “dialogue” 
described by Cover and Aleinikoff. AEDPA forbids the federal courts 
from engaging in that dialogue. As long as the state courts do not 
stray far from Supreme Court precedent, AEDPA prevents the 
federal courts from interfering. In Lockyer, the Court held that the 
state court did not unreasonably apply “clearly established Federal 
law.”108 But the Court’s decision—like the decision in Carey v. 
Musladin109—contributed nothing to development of the doctrine at 
issue, despite the admitted “lack of clarity” present.110 The Court 
concluded only by saying, “[t]he gross disproportionality principle 
reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary 
case.”111 
104. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
105. See Bloom, supra note 3, at 535 (arguing that Lockyer v. Andrade “excuses state courts 
from the often onerous task of making the right doctrinal choice”). 
106. 538 U.S. at 72. 
107. Id. at 72-73. 
108. Id. at 77. 
109. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. 
110. See Ides, supra note 3, at 747 (criticizing the Andrade Court for “compact[ing] the 
unreasonable-application standard into a rule that seems more like an abdication than it does 
like a respectful deference for proper state-court judgments”). 
111. 538 U.S. at 76. Indeed even if some doctrinal development could be squeezed from the 
Court’s discussion of the “gross disproportionality principle” in Lockyer, it would be dicta and 
hence unavailable for use by the lower federal courts in habeas cases. See supra notes 68-76 
and accompanying text. Perhaps to remedy this, the Court simultaneously issued a decision 
in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), in which a similar Eighth Amendment challenge 
to application of California’s three-strikes law came to the Court on a petition for writ of 
certiorari following direct appeal. Because of this procedural posture, Ewing presented an 
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The type of doctrine likely to founder on AEDPA’s shoals—and 
thus the type of doctrine most in need of development through 
petitions for certiorari from state court decisions—is one in which 
the Supreme Court’s opinions outline a rule which is very generally 
stated, or has significant gaps. Two case studies of doctrinal 
development further illustrate this dynamic. 
The first example is in the area of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, in which the pre- and post-AEDPA stories vary dramati­
cally. In 1977, Cover and Aleinikoff described how the Supreme 
Court’s dictum in McMann v. Richardson112—that defendants are 
due advice “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys 
in criminal cases”113—produced a rich variety of lower court opinions 
attempting to implement this constitutional principle.114 Cover 
and Aleinikoff concluded that this debate among lower courts 
“inform[ed] the Supreme Court” by allowing “state and lower federal 
courts to evaluate and discuss experiences ....”115 As a result, they 
concluded, it would be “far easier ... than it would have been ten 
years ago” for the Court to reject the then-prevailing and less-
protective “farce and mockery” standard for judging ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.116 Indeed, seven years after their 
article, the dialogical development Cover and Aleinikoff described 
came to fruition in the holding of Strickland v. Washington117 —that 
habeas relief is warranted if counsel is not reasonably effective. 
The post-AEDPA story of ineffective assistance of counsel is not 
as dynamic. In a trilogy of post-AEDPA habeas cases in which the 
Court has held trial counsel to be ineffective—Williams v. Taylor,118 
Wiggins v. Smith,119 and Rompilla v. Beard120—the Court has 
disavowed any claim to be breaking new ground.121 In each of these 
opportunity for the Court to develop doctrine, unfettered by the strictures of AEDPA. 
112. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
113. Id. at 771. 
114. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1060-64. 
115. Id. at 1065. 
116. Id. 
117. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
118. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
119. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
120. 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
121. Williams, 529 U.S. at 390 (“[T]he merits of [petitioner’s] claim are squarely governed 
by our holding in Strickland v. Washington ....”); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522 (Williams “made 
no new law”); Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393-94 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]oday’s decision 
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cases, the Court described the result as dictated by its 1984 
Strickland decision. This illustrates the notion articulated by Judge 
Noonan that, under the AEDPA regime, “[t]he development of 
doctrine is despised.”122 The formal categorization of the doctrine 
remains static and rigid. Doctrinal developments, if they occur at 
all,123 occur sub rosa—shoehorned into existing doctrinal boxes.
The possibility of sub rosa or surreptitious developments cannot 
fully overcome AEDPA’s impediments to doctrinal development. 
First, abrupt shifts in doctrine—as have been seen, for example, in 
landmark decisions such as Crawford v. Washington124 and Atkins 
v. Virginia125—are simply not possible in habeas corpus cases after 
AEDPA.126 Second, even gradual migratory shifts in doctrine are 
simply applies our longstanding case-by-case approach to determining whether an attorney’s 
performance was unconstitutionally deficient under Strickland v. Washington ....”). While 
jurists may disagree as to whether this trilogy of cases broke new ground or not, the question 
is beyond the scope of our Article. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 542-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
Court is mistaken to assert that [Williams] ‘made no new law’ ....”); Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 397 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing majority opinion as a “distortion of Strickland”). 
122. Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 667-68 (9th Cir. 2007) (Noonan, J., concurring). 
123. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (DeCoster I), aff’d 
en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (DeCoster III); see also id. at 276 (Bazelon, J., 
dissenting). See generally John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà Vu All Over 
Again:” Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the 
Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-019, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1024307 (discussing the doctrinal development represented by the Williams, Wiggins, and 
Rompilla decisions); id. at 27 (concluding these three decisions mark a doctrinal “shift 
towards the effective assistance of counsel standard once hailed by Judge Bazelon” of the D.C. 
Circuit). 
124. 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)). 
125. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (declaring execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth 
Amendment). 
126. That the Atkins decision banning execution of the mentally retarded would not have 
been possible after AEDPA underscores the differences between § 2254(d)(1) and the Teague 
analysis. Not only does AEDPA go beyond Teague by restricting the sources of “clearly 
established” law to Supreme Court precedent, see supra note 63 and accompanying text, but 
AEDPA also apparently fails to incorporate the Teague exceptions to non-retroactivity. See 
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 64, at 867-68. On this reading, the Court’s pre-AEDPA 
indication that a constitutional rule prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded (as was 
finally realized in Atkins) would fall within the Teague exception for rules declaring “‘certain 
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making 
authority to proscribe,’” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989) (quoting Teague, 489 
U.S. at 307), is inconsequential after AEDPA. 
At least one circuit has held that AEDPA incorporates the Teague exceptions. Bockting v. 
Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005). Whether this holding—in conflict with decisions from 
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits—was erroneous was among the questions presented to the 
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impeded. Ordinarily, each constitutional decision proceeds from the 
previous decision addressing the issue.127 Under AEDPA—as is seen 
in the Williams-Wiggins-Rompilla line of cases—each new decision 
proceeds not from the previous decision, but from the bedrock pre-
AEDPA decision in Strickland v. Washington.128 Even if these deci­
sions embody sub rosa or surreptitious development,129 it seems 
unlikely the doctrine will migrate as far as it might if untethered 
from Strickland.130 
A second example of AEDPA’s freezing effect involves two 
Supreme Court decisions involving claims of improper influence on 
the jury—Remmer v. United States131 and Smith v. Phillips.132 
Remmer and Smith are in sufficient tension that the general 
proposition to be drawn from them remains a matter of lively 
debate.133 In Remmer, the Court wrote: “In a criminal case, any 
private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, 
with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury 
is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial ....”134 In 
Smith, the Court addressed a claim of improper influence stemming 
from a juror’s pending application for employment as an investiga­
tor in the prosecutor’s office, but found that no presumption of bias 
was appropriate.135 
Supreme Court on certiorari review in Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). See 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Whorton, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (No. 05-595), at i, 17 (citing Gosier 
v. Welborn, 175 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999); Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 406-07 (4th 
Cir. 1999)). The Court, however, did not reach the issue. 
127. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. 
129. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 123, at 27-29. 
130. If the Strickland v. Washington decision is imagined as an apple tree at the north end 
of a large field, Williams v. Taylor was the first post-AEDPA tree to grow in the field. As the 
offspring of Strickland, the Williams tree of necessity grew close to the Strickland tree. 
Without AEDPA, Williams would have been permitted to bear its own fruit, and the decisions 
in Wiggins and Rompilla might have shown a gradual migration toward the south end of the 
field. AEDPA effectively requires all new trees to be seeded by Strickland, and prevents the 
new trees from bearing fruit of their own. Cf. J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity 
Theory To Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 
49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1448-56 (1996) (describing the evolutionary “walk” of nuisance law 
around its “fitness landscape”). 
131. 347 U.S. 227 (1954). 
132. 455 U.S. 209 (1982). 
133. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
134. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. 
135. Smith, 455 U.S. at 215 (holding that “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is 
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Seeking guidance from these decisions, the lower federal courts 
have divided as to whether and when to accord a presumption of 
bias to a claim of improper influence. While some courts extend the 
Remmer presumption generally to all claims of improper jury 
influence, others limit the presumption to claims involving third-
party contact with jurors, and yet others have limited the presump­
tion even in such cases.136 Before AEDPA, such confusion in the 
lower courts would have contributed to doctrinal development and 
increased the likelihood of an eventual grant of certiorari by the 
Court. After AEDPA, however, federal habeas courts simply deny 
petitioners relief, saying that the law is not clearly established.137 
What is most striking about this example, however, is that these 
habeas petitioners overwhelmingly failed to pursue certiorari from 
state court proceedings when they had the opportunity—even in 
capital cases.138 Collectively, this failure means the Court was not 
a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias”). 
136. See Tunstall v. Hopkins, 306 F.3d 601, 610-11 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Several circuits, 
including ours, have extended the Remmer presumption to claims alleging juror exposure to 
extraneous information, including claims of mid-trial media exposure .... However, other 
circuits have confined the application of Remmer to cases alleging third-party contact with 
jurors.” (citations omitted)); Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 839 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing 
cases holding “at least in part, that Phillips abandoned Remmer’s presumption of prejudice”). 
137. See, e.g., Billings v. Polk, 441 F.3d 238, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that a state 
court could reasonably conclude Remmer presumption is limited to cases involving third-party 
contact with jurors); Harnden v. Rowland, No. 04-16850, 2006 WL 1477762, at *1 (9th Cir. 
May 26, 2006) (mem.) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not clearly extended the Remmer 
presumption of prejudice beyond jury tampering cases.”); Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148, 
1155 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tracey v. Palmateer, 341 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 
no habeas relief available for jury bias allegations under AEDPA given that Remmer and 
Smith provide a “flexible rule”)); Tunstall, 306 F.3d at 611 (“When the federal circuits 
disagree on the application of Remmer regarding any presumption of prejudice, it is difficult 
to say the Iowa court’s decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.”). The rare decisions 
granting habeas relief on a Remmer/Smith issue circumvent AEDPA by relying on circuit 
precedent. See Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding under Fifth Circuit 
case law the question whether a Remmer presumption will apply is governed by whether the 
case is among “the genre of cases Justice O’Connor pointed to in her concurring opinion in 
Phillips”); Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2004) (purporting to apply AEDPA 
yet using circuit case law to “distill the principle that adequacy” of the trial court’s inquiry 
into alleged improper jury influence “is a function of the probability of bias; the greater that 
probability, the more searching the inquiry needed to make reasonably sure that an unbiased 
jury is impaneled”); id. at 487-88 (Evans, J., dissenting) (lamenting majority’s mere “lip 
service to the commands of AEDPA”). 
138. See Brooks, 444 F.3d at 328 (capital case wherein petitioner failed to seek certiorari 
from state postconviction proceedings where claim was first raised); Tracey, 341 F.3d at 1037 
       
             
            
   
                
             
            
                 
              
               
                 
               
              
               
             
              
            
              
             
               
              
             
                
            
            
             
             
             
            
                
            
             
    
    
         
        
          
    
         
        
          
        
        
         
         
       
2008] INITIATING A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 235 
given the opportunity to develop its constitutional doctrine in this 
area. The need for practitioners to adapt their certiorari-seeking 
practices to the realities of AEDPA is discussed more fully in 
Sections III.B and IV below. 
Some federal courts have determined to soldier on in expounding 
the Constitution despite AEDPA. The Second Circuit has approved 
an analysis in habeas petitions similar to that espoused by the 
Supreme Court for addressing qualified immunity questions in civil 
rights litigation.139 In habeas cases where doctrinal explication is 
appropriate, the Second Circuit will first address whether the state 
court erred, and second, whether the error was an unreasonable 
application of Supreme Court precedent.140 Thus, although the 
(petitioner failed to seek certiorari from state court judgments); Tunstall, 306 F.3d at 601 
(petitioner, serving life sentence, failed to seek certiorari from direct appeal and proceeded 
directly to federal habeas). 
139. Kruelski v. Conn. Super. Ct., 316 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2003). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 
194 (2001), the Supreme Court instructed lower federal courts to first determine whether a 
federal constitutional violation has occurred, and then to determine whether the federal law 
was “clearly established” at the time of the incident so as to deprive a state actor of qualified 
immunity. Id. at 201. Deciding the questions in this order, explained the Court, allows federal 
constitutional law to continue to develop, even if state actors are only liable for violations of 
it that were clearly established at the time that they acted. Id. (“This is the process for the 
law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon turning to the 
existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry. The law might be 
deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the 
law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the 
case.”); see also Steinman, supra note 3, at 1536-37. The “order of battle” requirement of 
Saucier has been criticized as inconsistent with principles of judicial restraint. See generally 
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2641-42 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“I would end the failed Saucier experiment now.”). Justice Breyer may 
soon have the opportunity to revisit the issue. On March 24, 2008, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in a civil rights damages case, and sua sponte directed the parties to address 
specifically whether Saucier should be overruled. Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008). 
The case is set for oral argument on October 14, 2008. The petitioner, 2008 WL 2367229, as 
well as amici, the Solicitor General, 2008 WL 2436685, thirty-one states and the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 2008 WL 2445507, and the Texas Association of School 
Boards, 2008 WL 2367228, argue for a decision overruling or limiting Saucier’s “order of 
battle” holding. A brief for the National Association of Counties, Council of State Government, 
and other amici, 2008 WL 2445508, argues in support of Saucier’s two-step approach, noting 
that “[c]onstitutional principles might never be clarified if every novel claim were met with 
the answer that it involved no violation of clearly established right,” id. at *26, and that the 
circuit court’s decision to consider the merits of the constitutional question before proceeding 
to the qualified immunity issue “reflects a sound regard for the proper development of 
constitutional law.” Id. at *32. 
140. Kruelski, 316 F.3d at 108. 
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circuit court decision is dicta and not binding on state courts, or 
even on lower federal courts,141 “state courts faced with federal 
questions may want to consult” such decisions.142 The Supreme 
Court has not approved that approach.143 
For the most part, however, it seems that doctrinal development 
will have to originate from some source other than federal habeas 
corpus. State prisoners’ certiorari petitions seeking review of direct 
appeals and state postconviction decisions will present increas­
ingly important opportunities for the Court to develop its criminal 
constitutional doctrine. The dissenters in Lawrence v. Florida ac­
knowledged this point, writing that, after AEDPA, “[e]ven if rare, 
the importance of our review of state habeas proceedings is 
evident.”144 
In theory, then, the “as determined by the Supreme Court” 
provision of AEDPA threatens to impede the development of 
constitutional doctrine. Our empirical work, discussed in the next 
section, reinforces this conclusion.
141. Id. at 106-07. 
142. Id. Compare Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) (adopting similar 
approach), with Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting approach), and 
Kruelski, 316 F.3d at 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (Sack, J., concurring) (rejecting approach). Whereas 
in the pre-AEDPA world described by Cover and Aleinikoff the redundant structure of habeas 
review forced state courts to view federal decisions with “respect and awareness,” Cover & 
Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1048, whether a state court chooses to “consult” federal decisions 
in the post-AEDPA world is completely up to the state court. See supra notes 93-96 and 
accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text (discussing Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. 
Ct. 649 (2007)); see also supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text (discussing Lockyer v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)). Writing in 2005, before Musladin, Professors Hertz and 
Liebman concluded that Williams determined that § 2254(d)(1) “require[s] careful attention 
not only to the ultimate judgment of the state court but also to the validity of the court’s 
reasoning process.” HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 48, at 1612 § 32.3. In that same section, 
they wrote that “the Court’s overall pattern in applying section 2254(d)(1) thus far” 
demonstrates that “situations other than the exceptional one presented in [Lockyer v. 
Andrade] ... are usually best resolved by addressing the merits before deciding the section 
2254(d)(1) issue.” Id. at 1621-22. Three years later, Padraic Foran, building on Professor 
Steinman’s article advocating “opinion deference,” supra note 3, argued that Musladin 
represents “an enshrinement of the result-deference framework that Williams had 
purportedly rejected for all the right reasons.” Foran, supra note 4, at 624. 
144. 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1089 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority decision in 
Lawrence which prompted this dissent may further discourage cert filings from state 
postconviction proceedings, because it concluded that such filings do not toll the one-year 
statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition under AEDPA. Id. at 1081 (majority 
opinion). 
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III. WHERE DO THE SUPREME COURT’S CASES COME FROM? 
A. The Supreme Court’s Certiorari-Granting Behavior 
To better understand the practical impact of AEDPA’s “as 
determined by the Supreme Court” provision, we examined the 
Court’s certiorari-granting behavior by compiling a list of criminal 
cases 145 decided146 over the last twelve terms, from October Term 
145. No two commentators are likely to agree on what cases are “criminal.” For example, 
looking at two reviews of the Court’s docket of criminal cases decided in the October 2006 
Term resulting in published opinions, we see differences that typify some of the issues that 
arise when attempting to define what is a “criminal case.”
The Annual Review of the Supreme Court’s Term Criminal Cases, prepared for the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice Section, identified thirty-one “criminal law 
related” cases, of which twenty-five were “fully criminal.” RORY LITTLE & SHARIF JACOB, 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT’S CRIMINAL CASES 2 (2007). These numbers included 
civil rights cases, prison cases, the challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, 
immigration, securities, and others arising under federal statutes with implications for 
criminal cases. Id. at 4-33. The analysis on SCOTUSblog prepared by Ben Winograd counted 
twenty-two criminal cases. Posting of Ben Winograd to SCOTUSblog, By the Numbers: 
Criminal Cases in OT06, www.scotusblog.com/wp/by-the-number-criminal-cases-in-OT06/ 
(July 9, 2007 10:55 EST). Of the 22 cases in the SCOTUSblog list, three—Scott v. Harris, 127 
S. Ct. 1769 (2007), Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007), and Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 
(2007)—were civil rights cases brought pursuant to § 1983. Two cases—Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 127 S. Ct. 815 (2007) and Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2007)—were certiorari 
grants from immigration proceedings, in which the Court addressed the immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions.
Although issues that arise in § 1983 suits and immigration cases can have important 
implications for criminal law doctrine, these procedural vehicles are not the subject of our 
inquiry. Because our interest here is not only in the development of doctrine, but also in 
determining whether the criminal defense bar’s certiorari-seeking behavior is out of step with 
the Supreme Court’s certiorari-granting behavior, we defined “criminal case” somewhat 
narrowly, to include only those cases in which a criminal judgment was being attacked or 
defended. Thus, civil rights cases and immigration cases were excluded. 
146. Just as people may reasonably disagree about which cases are “criminal,” determining 
when the Supreme Court has “decided” a case is a matter of interpretation. Ultimately, we 
opted to include cases in which there was a per curiam opinion or summary reversal, provided 
that there was sufficient legal reasoning to constitute an opinion, rather than an order. We 
also included cases in which certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted, or the case 
was dismissed as moot, provided that the memorandum decision was substantive enough to 
explain the reason for the dismissal. 
Thus, by way of example, we included in our analysis three cases that SCOTUSblog did not 
(although Professor Little did), in which the Court granted cert but did not issue opinions on 
the merits for procedural reasons. These cases were Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007), 
in which the Court determined that the petitioner had failed to seek permission to file a 
“second or successive” petition and so did not address the merits issue; Roper v. Weaver, 127 
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(OT) 1995 through OT 2006. Recognizing it is possible to count the 
cases in many different ways, we initially relied on two sources to 
gather our historical information.147 We then checked and supple­
mented those secondary sources by searching the Supreme Court 
reports for the twelve terms. 
Below is a chart summarizing the “criminal certiorari grants” 
that we analyzed, as broken down by term and by procedural 
vehicle. 
S. Ct. 2022 (2007), in which the Court determined that cert was improvidently granted; and 
Claiborne v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007), in which the case was dismissed as moot 
when the petitioner died. 
147. For the period from October Term (OT) 2002 through OT 2006, we used Westlaw’s 
“United States Supreme Court Actions” database, which includes a yearly review of cases 
decided. E.g., 07-24-2007 U.S. Sup. Ct. Actions 9. In OT 2006, we included one additional case 
in which certiorari was granted, and the judgment of the court of appeals was vacated as moot 
after the defendant died. Claiborne v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007). We think 
inclusion of this case is appropriate, though the Court did not reach the issues presented, 
given our emphasis on certiorari-granting behavior of the Court. For the period from OT 1995 
through OT 2001, we relied on a very useful and exhaustive series of articles written by 
Professor Christopher E. Smith. See Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, Criminal 
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2001-2002 Term, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 413 (2003); 
Christopher E. Smith & Steven B. Dow, Criminal Justice and the 2000-2001 U.S. Supreme 
Court Term, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189 (2002); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice 
and the 1999-2000 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 77 N.D. L. REV. 1 (2001); Christopher E. Smith, 
Criminal Justice and the 1998-99 United States Supreme Court Term, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 
23 (1999); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1997-98 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 
23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 443 (1999); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1996-97 U.S. 
Supreme Court Term, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 29 (1997), Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice 
and the 1995-96 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (1996). 
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CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF CASES
 
DECIDED BY PROCEDURAL VEHICLE
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2254 
DA-FED 
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20.0% 
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0.0% 
OT OT
OT OT OT OT OT OT OT OT OT OT OT OT
1995- 2001-­
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
2000 2006 
DA-ST 14.3%20.0%10.7%33.3%25.9%42.1%26.3%38.1%30.0%21.4%44.4%10.0%23.5%29.0% 
SPCV 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.7% 0.0% 5.0% 0.0% 2.8% 
2254 23.8%30.0%25.0%19.0%33.3%31.6%31.6%38.1%40.0%39.3%33.3%65.0%27.2%40.7% 
DA-FED 61.9%50.0%57.1%42.9%40.7%15.8%42.1%14.3%26.7%21.4%22.2%20.0%45.6%24.1% 
FPCV 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 4.8% 0.0% 10.5% 0.0% 9.5% 3.3% 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 3.4% 
TERM 
DA-ST: Direct appeal of state criminal conviction 
SPCV: State postconviction proceeding 
2254: State prisoner’s federal habeas petition 
DA-FED: Direct appeal of federal criminal conviction 
FPCV: Federal prisoner’s postconviction proceeding 
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The general trends discernible from this chart are more apparent 
when one compares the most recent six terms cumulatively to the 
terms before that, as shown in the following chart: 
CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF CASES
 
DECIDED BY PROCEDURAL VEHICLE
 
50.0% 
PP
EE
RR
CC
EE
NN
TT
AA
GG
EE
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5.0% 
10.0% 
15.0% 
20.0% 
25.0% 
30.0% 
35.0% 
40.0% 
45.0% 
OT 1995-2000 OT 2001-2006 
DA-ST 23.5% 29.0% 
SPCV 0.0% 2.8% 
2254 27.2% 40.7% 
DA-FED 45.6% 24.1% 
FPCV 3.7% 3.4% 
-  
 
-  
 
TERM 
Viewed cumulatively, it appears the Court has shifted away from 
certiorari grants in federal direct appeals and toward certiorari 
grants in federal habeas cases and, to a lesser degree, direct appeals 
from the state courts. Certiorari grants in federal direct appeals 
dropped from being the clearly dominant procedural vehicle, 
accounting for nearly half of the Court’s criminal cert grants, to a 
third-place position, accounting for only a quarter of the Court’s 
criminal docket. (Because the size of the Court’s criminal docket 
varies from year to year,148 we compared the percentages of the 
criminal docket represented by each procedural vehicle, rather than 
the absolute number of certiorari grants.) The ascendant star has 
148. During the OT 1995-OT 2006 period we reviewed, the number of criminal cases 
decided in a given term ranged from a low of 19 (in both OT 2000 and OT 2001) to a high of 
30 (in OT 2003). Cumulatively, the criminal docket was 136 cases decided in the period OT 
1995-OT 2000 and 145 cases decided in the period OT 2001-OT 2006. 
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been federal habeas cases, expanding from a quarter of the Court’s 
criminal docket to slightly over 40 percent. Also noteworthy is an 
increase in the percentage of cases granted from the direct appeal 
track in state court, modest in comparison to the rise in § 2254 
cases, yet still enough to place such cases above federal direct 
appeals in the hierarchy. We believe this modest increase149 in the 
Court’s acceptance of criminal cases from the state appellate process 
is actually the most significant change over the last twelve terms, 
and is the true harbinger of the direction the Court’s certiorari-
granting practice is headed in the wake of AEDPA. 
The Court’s certiorari-granting practice appears to us consistent 
with the theory that the Court is increasingly turning to state court 
judgments for certiorari grants which will allow the Court to 
develop criminal constitutional doctrine. To understand how this 
could be true, it is necessary to consider more specifically the 
characteristics of each procedural vehicle. First, certiorari grants 
from state court judgments will nearly always present the Court 
with an opportunity to develop criminal constitutional doctrine, 
whether from the direct appellate process150 or the more rare grant 
from the state postconviction process.151 
149. The increase accounted for eight more certiorari grants from state courts on direct 
review for the OT 2001-OT 2006 period than would have been expected, or 1.33 per term. 
While this seems a small increase, it is nonetheless an increase in certiorari grants that afford 
an opportunity for doctrinal development such as was seen in Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), or Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002). Furthermore, one might expect that the rise in § 2254 certiorari grants—if 
attributable to litigation over the meaning of AEDPA (see supra note 88 and accompanying 
text)—will be temporary. The decline in § 2254 grants which may be on the horizon will yield 
even more opportunities for the Court to increase its caseload with certiorari grants in 
criminal cases from state courts. 
150. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007) (passenger of vehicle has 
standing to bring Fourth Amendment claim for traffic stop); Cunningham v. California, 127 
S. Ct. 856 (2007) (California sentencing scheme violated Sixth Amendment jury trial 
guarantee); Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (whether hearsay was “testimonial” 
for purposes of Confrontation Clause claim); Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006) (Kansas 
death penalty statute does not violate Eighth Amendment); Oregon v. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. 1226 
(2006) (no constitutional right to present alibi at resentencing that was inconsistent with prior 
conviction). 
151. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (reconsidering Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361 (1989), and holding execution of defendant who was under eighteen at the time 
of the crime violates the Eighth Amendment and Due Process); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 
186-87 (2004) (“We granted certiorari ... to resolve an important question of constitutional 
law, i.e., whether counsel’s failure to obtain the defendant’s express consent to a strategy of 
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Certiorari grants from federal criminal cases may present the 
Court with such opportunities, but need not. Federal criminal 
prosecutions certainly implicate constitutional rights, and the Court 
may develop criminal constitutional doctrine through review of such 
cases as they proceed through the appellate process.152 However, the 
Court may also—and often does—review federal cases solely to 
address nonconstitutional questions of federal law, such as the 
application of federal rules,153 interpretation of federal statutes,154 
interpretation or application of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines,155 or application of federal common law.156 Often the 
Court has the ability to resolve federal criminal cases on 
nonconstitutional grounds, applying the principle of constitutional 
avoidance.157 Thus, whether and to what extent the Court uses 
certiorari grants in federal criminal cases to develop constitutional 
doctrine seems to be in the Court’s control.
Moreover, federal criminal cases may not present the same kinds 
of constitutional issues as state criminal cases. Because the vast 
conceding guilt in a capital trial automatically renders counsel’s performance deficient, and 
whether counsel’s effectiveness should be evaluated under Cronic or Strickland.”) (citing 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984)); Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004) (finding that jury instructions violated Eighth 
Amendment by preventing jury from giving effect to mitigating evidence). 
152. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006) (holding that the 
denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of one’s choosing is complete without showing 
of prejudice and is not susceptible to harmless error analysis); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 
166 (2003) (announcing Due Process limitations to government’s ability to forcibly medicate 
criminal defendant to restore competency). 
153. See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) (delineating 
prejudice requirement for violation of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11); Old Chief 
v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (interpreting Federal Rules of Evidence Rules 401 and 
403). 
154. See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (interpreting “convicted in any 
court,” as used in felon-in-possession-of-firearm statute, to exclude convictions from foreign 
courts); Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003) (allowing Chief Judge of the Northern 
Mariana Islands to sit by designation on the Ninth Circuit violated the designation statute). 
155. See, e.g., Salinas v. United States, 547 U.S. 188 (2006) (holding simple possession is 
not “controlled substance offense” within meaning of career offender sentencing guideline); 
Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996) (holding that the weight of blotter paper is to be 
considered in calculating sentence under sentencing guideline for LSD crime). 
156. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270 (2003) (holding that a 
conspiracy does not automatically terminate when the government defeats the conspiracy’s 
object). 
157. See, e.g., Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 76 n.9 (“We find it unnecessary to discuss the 
constitutional questions because the statutory violation is clear.”). 
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majority of criminal cases in the U.S. are prosecuted in state 
courts,158 certain kinds of important federal constitutional issues 
may arise more frequently—or nearly exclusively—in state court 
criminal proceedings. For example, the paradigm shift in con­
frontation clause jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington,159 and 
its successor case Davis v. Washington,160 was announced in cases 
arising out of local criminal proceedings from Washington. The 
confrontation issues presented in Crawford and Davis appeared 
with greater frequency and in more extreme ways in state prosecu­
tions, particularly domestic violence cases. 161 Accordingly, these 
decisions have huge implications for domestic violence and child 
abuse cases in state courts,162 in which certain kinds of out-of-court 
statements by complainants and witnesses had been previously 
regularly admitted.
Finally, the Court’s opportunity to develop criminal constitutional 
doctrine through certiorari grants in federal habeas cases has 
diminished over time.163 During the period that represents the first 
158. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that, in 2004, 1,079,000 adults were convicted 
in state courts, compared with 66,518 adults convicted in federal courts. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, http://www.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/bjs/sent.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2008). Certain kinds of prosecutions, like family 
violence, may be even more heavily concentrated in state and local courts. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS 2 (June 2005), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf. The Bureau reported that “more than 207,000” 
family violence crimes were “recorded by police in 18 States and the District of Columbia in 
2000,” but that only “757 suspects [were] referred to U.S. attorneys for domestic violence 
offenses between 2000 and 2002 ....” Id. By contrast, about one-third of the 1500 defendants 
charged with felony assault in 11 large counties in a single month—May 2000—were charged 
with family violence. Id. Thus, the total number of federal domestic violence prosecutions over 
a two-year period probably equaled only a couple of months of state domestic violence 
prosecutions in the local courts of a few large U.S. counties. 
159. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
160. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
161. See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U.PA.L.REV. 
1171, 1180-81 (2002) (“Many of the cases that have used dial-in testimony—statements made 
in 911 calls and to responding officers—have involved charges of domestic violence.”). 
162. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened—And What Is Happening—to the 
Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587 (2007); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: 
Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006); Myrna Raeder, 
Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and 
Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311 (2005). 
163. Some kinds of federal constitutional claims by state prisoners cannot be litigated in 
federal habeas. Under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), exclusionary claims under the 
Fourth Amendment generally cannot be raised by state prisoners in federal habeas 
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half of our empirical study, from OT 1995 through OT 2000, it 
remained possible for cases to arrive at the Court still uncon­
strained by the strictures of AEDPA. In OT 1999, for example, the 
Court granted certiorari in three cases in which the underlying 
habeas petition was filed before AEDPA’s effective date, and the 
Court was therefore able to develop constitutional doctrine in each 
case. 164 This is not to say that the Court often availed itself of this 
opportunity—many of the Court’s decisions arising from habeas 
review during this period merely administered the habeas-restrict­
ing doctrines discussed above which preceded AEDPA.165 Nonethe­
less it was theoretically possible to accept cases to which AEDPA 
would not apply and to develop doctrine through those cases. In 
more recent terms, however, the availability of cases to which 
AEDPA does not apply is limited.166 
Thus, the increase in certiorari grants in § 2254 cases does not 
represent the Court’s attempt to develop constitutional doctrine. 
Instead, it appears that the spate of federal habeas grants repre­
sents a continued effort to administer habeas-limiting doctrines 
such as retroactivity167 and exhaustion,168 as well as procedural 
proceedings, and must be litigated on direct appeal or state postconviction. 
164. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000) (holding prosecutor’s comments in summation 
—regarding defendant’s opportunity to observe witnesses’ testimony before taking the 
stand—did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 
(2000) (extending Strickland standard to cover claim that appellate counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file a merits brief); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (extending 
Strickland standard to cover claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file notice of 
appeal). 
165. See, e.g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (exhaustion doctrine); Trest v. 
Cain, 522 U.S. 87 (1997) (procedural default); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997) 
(Teague retroactivity doctrine); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996) (Teague retroactivity 
doctrine). 
166. The Court’s recent decision in Arave v. Hoffman, 128 S. Ct. 749 (2007) (per curiam), 
presented a rare case for the Court to develop doctrine through federal habeas review 
unconstrained by AEDPA. The Court, however, ultimately dismissed petitioner’s claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel as moot so that petitioner could “proceed with the 
resentencing ordered by the District Court.” Id. at 750.
167. See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007) (retroactivity of Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004) (retroactivity of Mills 
v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (retroactivity 
of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)). 
168. See, e.g., Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that petitioner presented claim 
to state courts with sufficient particularity to satisfy exhaustion requirement); Baldwin v. 
Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004) (finding that petitioner did not fairly present ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel claim to state courts). 
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litigation concerning the interpretation and operation of AEDPA. In 
the decade since AEDPA’s passage, litigants have raised questions 
regarding whether AEDPA applies,169 administration of AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations,170 certificate of appealability requirements,171 
and procedural barriers to second or successive petitions.172 
The increase in federal habeas cases accepted by the Court may 
also reflect concern with administration of the death penalty. The 
majority of federal habeas certiorari grants in the past five terms 
have involved capital cases, while capital cases are rarely reviewed 
from the direct appeal track.173 The dissent in Kansas v. Marsh 
suggests that at least four members of the Court are concerned 
about the death penalty in light of the DNA exonerations.174 It is 
also possible that large firms and experienced Supreme Court 
practitioners are more likely to take on capital cases at the federal 
habeas stage as pro bono projects.175 
With the characteristics of each procedural vehicle in mind, and 
examining the change in the Court’s certiorari-granting behavior 
169. See, e.g., Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003) (holding that habeas petition was 
not pending on AEDPA’s effective date and AEDPA therefore constrained review). 
170. Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) (holding AEDPA’s statute of limitation 
was not tolled while petitioner sought certiorari in Supreme Court from denial of state 
postconviction relief); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (holding that district court may 
raise AEDPA’s statute of limitations sua sponte); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) 
(holding AEDPA’s statute of limitations was not tolled by untimely postconviction motion filed 
in state court). 
171. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (holding petitioner was entitled to 
Certificate of Appealability (COA) as to Brady claim); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 
(2003) (holding petitioner was entitled to COA as to claim that prosecutor exercised 
peremptory strikes in racially discriminatory manner); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 
(2000). 
172. See, e.g., Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007) (holding that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction to review petition where petitioner did not seek order permitting second 
or successive petition); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (discussing what constitutes 
“second or successive habeas petition” under AEDPA); Slack, 529 U.S. 473. 
173. Rates of capital cases for the procedural vehicles over the past five terms were as 
follows: DA-FED, 0 percent (0 capital cases of 26 decided); DA-ST, 15 percent (5/34); 2254, 56 
percent (29/52) SPCV, 100 percent (4/4). 
174. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2541 (2006) (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
JJ., dissenting). This focus on the death penalty may not be limited to the Court. Professor 
King’s study of post-AEDPA habeas petitions in district courts concludes that capital habeas 
petitioners win relief at a rate thirty-five times higher than in non-capital cases. KING ET AL., 
supra note 5, at 10. 
175. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: 
Transforming the Court By Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L. J. 1487, 1557 (2008). 
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over the past twelve terms, as depicted in the chart above, it seems 
likely the Court is turning, and will continue to turn, to state court 
cases for doctrinal development. The Court is deciding fewer federal 
direct appeals than it did half a dozen years ago.176 The increase in 
certiorari grants in federal habeas cases reflects, we believe, 
technical litigation about AEDPA rather than doctrinal develop­
ment, because procedural questions are emerging as more petitions 
are governed by AEDPA. In light of these developments, the 
increase in certiorari grants from the state courts—cases where a 
federal constitutional question is nearly always decided on the 
merits—seems important. 
But the Court can only decide the cases presented to it. What 
types of cases are being presented to the Supreme Court, and in 
what procedural posture do they arise? 
B. Practitioners’ Certiorari-Seeking Behavior 
To answer this question, we set out to survey all criminal 
certiorari petitions filed during OT 2006 (those with 06- docket 
numbers).177 We divided petitions into five categories: (1) direct 
appeals from federal criminal convictions, (2) federal prisoners’ 
176. It is important to keep in mind that our analysis in Part III reflects overall trends, and 
that there are, of course, year-by-year decreases or increases in certain categories of cases. For 
example, among criminal cases with 06- docket numbers (certiorari petitions filed in OT 
2006), the Court granted cert in a good number of federal direct criminal appeals—some of 
which were argued and decided as this Article was being written. Many of these cases 
(although not all) address questions about federal sentencing. See Begay v. United States, 128 
S. Ct. 32 (2007), Boulware v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 32 (2007); Claiborne v. United States, 
127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007) (vacated as moot); Cuellar v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007); Gall 
v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007); Gonzalez v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 32 (2007); 
Kimbrough v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007); Logan v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1251 
(2007); Watson v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007); United States v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 
1874 (2007); Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 551 (2007); United States v. Rodriquez, 128 S. 
Ct. 33 (2007). This series of cert grants ultimately could affect the procedural composition of 
the 2007-2008 docket. 
177. We recognize it would be of interest to track certiorari-seeking trends for more than 
one term. Only through such an analysis will it become clear whether certiorari-seeking 
behavior has evolved over time, in response to AEDPA’s passage. However, as described in 
footnote 178, which sets out our methodology, obtaining and coding the data for even a single 
term required a significant investment of resources. The Court’s electronic database, from 
which we obtained data about IFP petitions, does not even catalogue cases prior to 2004. 
Limiting our examination to OT 2006 petitions is also consistent with our focus on current 
certiorari-seeking behavior.
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postconviction motions (usually brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255), (3) state prisoners’ direct appeals from state court convic­
tions, (4) state prisoners’ federal habeas petitions (brought pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254), and (5) state court postconviction proceedings. 
For the “paid” petitions, we also had a group of appeals under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which were included as 
federal direct appeal cases or federal postconviction cases, depend­
ing on their procedural posture.178 
178. The first step was to obtain data on the cert petitions filed. BNA/U.S. Law Week 
maintains a database of all “paid” petitions and granted IFP petitions, which it categorizes 
by subject area. We wrote a computer program to search this database for cases identified as 
criminal. For comparison, we wrote a computer program that identified criminal cases from 
the Supreme Court’s web-based docket. It flagged cases as potentially criminal based on the 
presence of certain words in the caption: for example, the words “United States” or “State,” 
or the proper name of a state, were identified as flags, as were terms common to habeas case 
captions, such as “Warden” and “Superintendent.” We also excluded in forma pauperis (IFP) 
cases from this chart, because only granted IFP cases were included in these sources, and we 
developed a separate IFP analysis. 
We compared the results of these programs, found very little disagreement, and aggregated 
them. An additional five cases that were not identified by the search of the BNA/U.S. Law 
Week database were added by our program that flagged potential criminal cases based on key 
words in the caption. We also did a “spot check,” comparing our database against selected 
orders lists from OT 2006. We excluded pro se filings, because the focus of our investigation 
is into the certiorari-seeking behavior of practitioners, not individual litigants. We recognize 
that this system would not count filings in which a pro se prisoners’s cert petition was granted 
and counsel was later appointed by the Supreme Court, such as Burgess v. United States, 128 
S. Ct. 1572 (2008), in which Professor Jeffrey L. Fisher of the Stanford Supreme Court 
Litigation Clinic was appointed to represent the criminal defendant. However, we are 
primarily interested here in attorney cert-seeking behavior; the Court’s cert-granting behavior 
is addressed in Part II.A. 
That left us with 347 “paid,” counseled criminal petitions for OT 2006. Although the BNA 
database did not include the procedural posture of the case, it did include a cite to the lower 
court opinion. Copies of cert petitions in all “paid” and granted cases are available on 
Westlaw. Using the published lower court opinions and the cert petitions, we were able to 
determine the procedural vehicle for the 347 “paid” counseled cases identified as criminal.
Information was considerably more difficult to obtain for the IFP cases, particularly those 
in which certiorari was not granted. BNA/U.S. Law Week and Westlaw do not maintain 
information about the petitions in such cases—in part because of the large numbers, but also 
because IFP litigants are not required to provide as many copies of their filings to the Court, 
so there is no copy for the press. Indeed, for a time, it seemed we would have to travel to the 
National Archives or the United States Supreme Court to review the IFP cert petitions on 
paper. (We submitted a comment to the Court’s proposed revised rules in the summer of 2007, 
suggesting that the Court require parties in all counseled cases (including counseled IFP 
cases) to submit electronic versions of their filings, in order to promote transparency at the 
Court and facilitate this type of research project. Letter from Professors Giovanna Shay & 
Christopher Lasch to the Court Clerk (June 2, 2007) (on file with authors). The Court declined 
our suggestion, instead requiring electronic copies of briefs only in granted cases. SUP. CT. R. 
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What did this empirical study reveal? For both the “paid” cases 
and the counseled IFP cases, federal direct appeal was the leading 
procedural vehicle for criminal certiorari petitions.179 Also, in both 
categories of cases, state prisoners’ filings from state postconviction 
proceedings lagged behind their filings out of federal habeas. The 
following chart illustrates our results. 
25 (2007); see also Letter from the Court Clerk to Professors Giovanna Shay & Christopher 
Lasch (Aug. 1, 2007) (on file with authors)). 
To get basic information about these cases, we used our computer program that examines 
the electronic Supreme Court docket sheets. The program produced a spreadsheet of all of the 
IFP cases, which have docket numbers beginning with 5000; it flagged those cases that might 
be criminal based on the presence of certain words in the captions. When we began the coding 
process, however, it became obvious that the overwhelming majority of IFP cases were 
indigent criminal defendants’ cases, and so we decided to code a representative sampling of 
all the IFP cases, eliminating the few noncriminal cases that turned up as we did the coding. 
When we ran the program, some 6854 IFP cert petitions filed in OT 2006 were identified 
as potential criminal cases, based on our flags. Many of these were pro se. Again, as with the 
“paid” cases, we decided to exclude the pro se petitions. For the IFP petitions, we did this both 
for the reasons discussed above, but also because the pro se IFP petitions were simply too 
numerous (we did the coding without the benefit of research assistants, but recommend them 
for future studies). Excluding the pro se cases yielded 3117 counseled IFP cases.
To obtain a random sampling—designed to guard against a concentration of filings of one 
type at a certain time of the year—we assigned the IFP cases random integers and sorted 
them by the random number assigned. We then coded the first 300 of the IFP cases 
(eliminating noncriminal cases), producing a coded group of randomly-selected, counseled IFP 
petitions, which we believe provides a random, representative sampling of the IFP petitions. 
179. Among the “paid” petitions filed, more than one-third of the cert petitions filed from 
federal direct appeals contained a sentencing question, probably reflecting litigation in the 
wake of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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PERCENTAGE OF COUNSELED PETITIONS FILED BY PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
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DA-ST 25% 13% 15% 
 
-  
 
-  
The breakdown among the “paid” cases was 44 percent federal 
prisoners’ direct appeals, 25 percent state prisoners’ direct appeals, 
18 percent state prisoners’ federal habeas cases, 6 percent state 
prisoners’ state postconviction proceedings, and 6 percent federal 
postconviction proceedings.180 
The domination of federal appeals appears to be even more 
complete in the indigent criminal defense community—68 percent 
of counseled IFP petitions in criminal cases were filed in federal 
criminal direct appeals. This percentage is particularly dramatic 
considering there were many more people admitted to state prison 
than to federal prison during this period.181 The remaining percent­
180. There were 42 government appeals among the 347 paid petitions that we coded. The 
U.S. Solicitor General filed two cert petitions in federal direct appeals, Docket, United States 
v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1874 (2007) (No. 06-694), Docket, United States v. Rodriquez, 128 S. 
Ct. 33 (2007) (No. 06-1646), and one in a § 2255 proceeding, Docket, United States v. Santos, 
127 S. Ct. 2098 (2007) (No. 06-1005). All of the Solicitor General’s cert petitions were granted. 
Although our principal focus is the defense community, AEDPA’s effect on doctrinal 
development has implications for all criminal practitioners. 
181. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that 56,057 prisoners were admitted to the 
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ages for IFP petitions were 13 percent state court direct appeals, 13 
percent state prisoners’ federal habeas petitions, 4 percent state 
postconviction proceedings, and 2 percent federal postconviction 
proceedings. 
The weighted totals182 reflect the fact that IFP petitions are much 
more common than “paid” petitions—so much so that the pattern of 
filing in IFP cases is close to representative of the pattern for all 
counseled petitions as a group. Based on our review of all “paid” 
petitions and a representative sample of IFP petitions, the weighted 
totals indicate that of all counseled petitions filed in criminal cases, 
the vast majority are direct appeals in federal cases, while direct 
appeals from state court are grossly underrepresented. 
Thus, although both a doctrinal analysis of AEDPA’s “as deter­
mined by the Supreme Court” provision and an empirical analysis 
of the Court’s certiorari-granting behavior suggest the increasing 
importance of seeking certiorari—and of the opportunity to seek 
certiorari—from state direct appeal and postconviction judgments, 
state prisoners simply do not file cert petitions at the same rate as 
federal criminal defendants.183 And state prisoners filed far more 
petitions from federal habeas proceedings than they did from state 
postconviction proceedings—despite the nearly absolute barrier 
AEDPA seems to impose on doctrinal development through habeas. 
In the next section we consider factors that could contribute to the 
cert-filing gap between federal and state proceedings and the 
imbalance between practitioners’ certiorari-seeking behavior and 
the Court’s certiorari-granting behavior. 
federal system in calendar year 2005, compared with 676,952 admitted to state jurisdictions. 
WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON AND 
JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006, at 3, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf. 
182. Because we coded all “paid” petitions, but only a representative sample of IFP 
petitions, it would make little sense to simply add these numbers together. Our “weighted 
total” column weights the sampled IFP results to account for the 3117 counseled IFP petitions 
from which the sample was drawn. 
183. That nearly two-thirds of the counseled certiorari petitions filed were on direct appeal 
from federal criminal convictions is particularly astonishing given that federal convictions 
comprise only a fraction of total criminal convictions. See supra note 158 and accompanying 
text. 
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IV. REPRESENTATION IN SEEKING CERTIORARI FROM STATE COURT 
JUDGMENTS 
Our findings have a number of implications for the potential 
effects of AEDPA’s “as determined by the Supreme Court” provision. 
Federal prisoners’ dominance of the certiorari filings may not seem 
at first blush directly related to the AEDPA issues that are the focus 
of our research. But this gap may indicate that state court criminal 
practitioners are not as focused on Supreme Court practice, which 
could help explain why state prisoners file more petitions out of 
federal habeas than out of state postconviction.
The logical next question is: what factors contribute to the 
relatively low rate of certiorari filing out of state court? The reasons 
for the gap may be numerous and varied. Many state convictions 
may not be serious enough to warrant pursuing through the cert 
stage.184 “Cert-worthy” questions, as currently understood by sophis­
ticated Supreme Court practitioners (questions generating jurisdic­
tional splits),185 may not arise as often in state criminal cases. State 
court criminal practitioners may not be as comfortable or familiar 
with federal (let alone Supreme Court) practice, and may not be 
admitted to the Supreme Court bar. State public defender statutes 
and policies may prohibit defenders from filing cert petitions, or 
may not provide funding for doing so.186 
184. State prisoners will generally have a longer wait than federal prisoners before arriving 
at the Supreme Court. A federal prisoner need only pursue one appeal before the certiorari 
stage, but many state prisoners will have one appeal of right and an additional level of 
discretionary review to be exhausted before seeking certiorari. This discretionary appeal may 
take years to complete. Thus, some state prisoners may be more likely to serve their sentences 
entirely before the time for seeking certiorari arrives. 
185. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 88, at 407; H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: 
AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 246 (1990) (“[T]he single most 
important generalizable factor in assessing certworthiness is the existence of a conflict or 
‘split’ in the circuits.”). 
186. Defense counsel operating under the federal Criminal Justice Act, by contrast, may 
be required (and paid) to file a cert petition if the client requests it and there are nonfrivolous 
issues to be raised. See, e.g., 6TH CIR. R. 101(g); Sixth Circuit CJA Form 20 Submission 
Instructions at 7, available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/forms/documents/ 
CJA200507.pdf (“Time and expenses in connection with the filing of a petition for writ of 
certiorari should be included on the CJA Form 20 submitted to the Court of Appeals.”). 
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Indeed, as former state public defenders with some exposure to 
Supreme Court litigation practice, we suspect there might be a 
cultural disconnect between state criminal practice and certiorari 
practice in the Supreme Court. Although state court criminal 
practice is by definition a local endeavor, Supreme Court litigation 
has become a national enterprise, with sophisticated advocates 
searching for federal circuit splits that are readily identifiable to 
Supreme Court law clerks as “cert-worthy.”187 By contrast, local 
criminal defense attorneys are often under-resourced188 and may not 
readily expend resources on cert petitions deemed to be “long-shots.” 
The low percentage of cert petitions granted each year probably 
further discourages practitioners.189 
Other factors may limit the number of cert petitions filed from 
state court judgments by the private bar. Litigants who are not 
eligible for appointed counsel may not want to expend the resources 
for a cert petition that has little chance for success.190 Their local 
counsel may advise them it is not worth the effort. By contrast, 
federal defendants may feel their chances at a cert grant are better, 
or they may simply have the resources to expend to hire a lawyer. 
And Supreme Court practitioners may be willing to file a cert 
petition pro bono on behalf of a federal defendant with a classically 
cert-worthy issue—for example, a question of federal statutory 
interpretation on which the circuit courts are split—particularly if 
the case, if granted, will garner a Supreme Court argument.
187. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the 
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 980 (2007) (book review) (“Ascertaining the presence 
of a lower court conflict requires less subjectivity from law clerks than determining, for 
example, whether [a case presents an] ‘important question of federal law ....’” (quoting SUP. 
CT. R. 10cc))); see also Cordray & Cordray, supra note 88, at 407; PERRY, supra note 185, at 
246. 
188. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENSE, GIDEON’S 
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, at iv-vi (2004), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf 
[hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE]. 
189. Saul Brenner, Granting Certiorari by the United States Supreme Court: An Overview 
of the Social Science Studies, LAW LIB. J. 193, 195, available at http://www.aallnet.org/ 
products/pub_llj_v92n02/2000-17.pdf (finding that in 1995, Court granted 4 percent of “paid” 
petitions and 0.3 percent of IFP petitions). 
190. Indeed, for litigants who cannot proceed in forma pauperis, even the costs of printing 
a certiorari petition may be daunting. 
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Another factor undoubtedly contributing to the gap between local 
criminal litigation and Supreme Court practice is the increasing 
professionalization of the Supreme Court bar. In a recent paper, 
Professor Richard Lazarus describes “the emergence of a new elite 
Supreme Court Bar,” beginning in about 1985.191 This group of elite 
lawyers enjoys great success in convincing the Court to grant cases. 
For example, in OT 2005, twenty-four of the sixty-seven [non-
Solicitor General] petitions in which certiorari was granted were 
filed by counsel who Professor Lazarus defined as “expert.”192 Expert 
counsel are skilled at casting a case as “cert-worthy,”193 and enjoy 
the respect and confidence of the Supreme Court law clerks who 
make recommendations regarding cert.194 Although the new 
Supreme Court elite may take on the occasional pro bono criminal 
case as a “loss leader” to increase their exposure before the Court,195 
their usual clients are large private sector companies.196 Lazarus 
writes (albeit without citation) that the criminal defense bar is 
reluctant to allow experienced Supreme Court practitioners to assist 
with their cases.197 Whether this assertion is true, whether it applies 
uniformly to all Supreme Court experts, and whether there is any 
legitimate basis for defenders’ reluctance to surrender control of 
their clients’ cases are all questions that may be debated.
There may be a kind of emerging “market” for the most cert­
worthy criminal cases, in which sophisticated Supreme Court 
practitioners shop for jurisdictional splits and take on pro bono 
cases, 198 and the growing number of law school Supreme Court 
191. Lazarus, supra note 175, at 1490, 1497. 
192. Id. at 1516-17. Prof. Lazarus defined “expert” to mean that they had personally argued 
a case before the Supreme Court at least five times, or that they were affiliated with a firm 
whose lawyers had done at least ten Supreme Court arguments. Id. at 1502. 
193. Id. at 1528. 
194. Id. at 1525. 
195. Id. at 1557. 
196. Id. at 1531 (“The individuals dominating the Supreme Court bar today as petitioners 
are mostly private sector attorneys working with law firms and representing business 
interests.”). 
197. However, a number of recent cases have been argued by elite Supreme Court 
practitioners from “white shoe” firms. E.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007) 
(argued by Donald Verrilli, of Jenner & Block); Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006) 
(same); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (same); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) 
(argued by Edward H. Tillinghast, III, of Coudert Brothers, LLP). 
198. Lazarus, supra note 175, at 1557-58. 
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clinics may contribute to the competition for cert-worthy cases.199 
Judgments of state courts may be a relatively untapped source of 
potential pro bono cases for this market.200 However, the pro bono 
market is small and focuses primarily on a single indicator of cert­
worthiness—jurisdictional splits susceptible to computer searching. 
Moreover, even expert offers of help sometimes are met with a cold 
reception. Criminal practitioners may be reluctant to relinquish 
cases that they have developed, suspicious of the motives of “big 
firm” counsel who represent mostly private interests, or resentful 
that offers of help arrive only when a client’s case is headed to the 
Supreme Court.201 
Obviously, it is a complicated task to unravel the role of all of 
these factors to explain why state prisoners seek cert on direct 
appeal less frequently than federal prisoners, and why state 
prisoners’ postconviction cert filings lag behind state prisoners’ 
filings out of federal habeas. We decided to focus on only a single 
aspect of the problem—possible structural or common barriers to 
appointed counsel seeking certiorari from judgments of state courts. 
To that end, we did a small survey of public defenders regarding 
cert-seeking practices and the factors that influence these practices. 
A. Defender Certiorari Survey 
We disseminated a survey through the National Legal Aid and 
Defender Association (NLADA) leadership group. 202 It asked 
whether respondents’ offices represented clients in seeking certio­
rari from judgments of state courts in direct appeals and state 
postconviction proceedings.203 
199. Id. In the spirit of full disclosure, while a Cover Fellow, coauthor Giovanna Shay was 
an instructor in the Yale Supreme Court Advocacy Clinic. 
200. See, e.g., Golphin v. Florida, 128 S. Ct. 40 (2007) (denying certiorari in Fourth 
Amendment case out of Florida Supreme Court, in which Yale clinic filed cert petition); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Golphin v. Florida, 128 S. Ct 40 (2007) (No. 06-1251). 
201. Lazarus, supra note 175, at 1560-61. 
202. NLADA, Certiorari Survey (2007) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Survey]. 
203. We also asked questions designed to identify some of the factors governing whether 
cert petitions are filed. We do not attach statistical significance to the results. We offer it only 
as an initial, exploratory instrument to tease out some future areas of inquiry. We asked the 
respondents who said they represented clients in filing cert petitions on direct appeal of 
criminal convictions from state court to select (or write in) factors that influenced their 
decision whether to file. Id. The leading response was “significance of the issue” (twenty-six 
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We received forty-two responses.204 Of these, one state public 
defender office—Pennsylvania’s—said it was statutorily barred from 
providing representation to clients seeking certiorari from a 
judgment of a state court on direct appeal.205 
Pennsylvania and seven more state public defender respondents 
(Massachusetts,206 Louisiana, Florida, Connecticut,207 New Hamp­
shire,208 Virginia, and Delaware209) said they did not usually file cert 
petitions from state postconviction matters.210 The reasons given 
included that these offices do not represent clients in state 
postconviction proceedings (in part because such proceedings often 
allege ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or on direct appeal, 
which would create a conflict of interest for the public defender 
respondents). The second most-frequently response was “death penalty case” (twenty 
responses). Id. Closely following were “likelihood of success” (nineteen respondents), 
“contradicts U.S. Supreme Court precedent” (eighteen), and “attorney interest” (sixteen). Id. 
The presence of a jurisdictional split—the leading indicator of whether the Supreme Court 
will grant cert—ranked sixth in frequency of selection (fifteen respondents). Id. Fourteen 
respondents selected “severity of penalty” (which overlaps with “death penalty”), and thirteen 
respondents cited “availability of resources.” Id. Only three said that their decision to file was 
affected by their statutory mandate. Id. 
204. One respondent was exclusively a federal defender agency that did not represent 
clients in state court. Id. We received seven responses from a single federal defender office 
that did some state court work to exhaust clients’ claims. Id. 
205. 16 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9960.6 (2008) (listing situations in which the “public defender 
shall be responsible for furnishing legal counsel”). One California public defender responded 
that the courts appointed appellate counsel (and that the issue had not arisen in his tenure), 
and two South Carolina offices reported that a separate state defender agency handles cert 
petitions. Survey supra note 202. 
206. The survey respondent noted that cert petitions from postconviction were “generally 
handled by the Committee’s Private Counsel Division,” which confirmed in its response that 
it did handle such petitions. See infra note 218. 
207. The Connecticut public defender responded that office policy was that the public 
defender could file a petition for a writ of certiorari in a meritorious postconviction case, but 
that “to this point a case of sufficient import has not come up.” Survey supra note 202. The 
respondent also cited resource constraints and small likelihood of success as factors. Id. 
208. While the respondent noted that the office was generally precluded from representing 
clients in postconviction proceedings, because it had represented most defendants at trial or 
on appeal, she noted that “when we can represent [postconviction] clients, we would consider 
seeking cert.” Id. 
209. The survey respondent noted that the office was “unlikely to represent clients on 
postconviction because most claims involve [ineffective assistance of counsel].” Id. 
210. The Virginia Indigent Defense Commission responded in a follow-up phone interview 
that it does not file cert petitions from state postconviction proceedings because it does not 
represent clients in state postconviction. Telephone Interview with David J. Johnson, 
Executive Dir., Va. Indigent Def. Comm’n (Dec. 5, 2007). 
     
     
  
          
   
         
         
           
        
        
           
          
          
          
      
        
            
        
           
          
             
        
         
          
           
        
            
 
          
          
      
           
         
            
 
256 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:211 
agency). A Florida office cited a statutory bar. Two offices also 
named resource constraints.
Two responses gave some insight into the relatively small group 
of cert filings from state postconviction. One state public defender 
from Florida said his office would be more inclined to pursue federal 
habeas relief before filing a certiorari petition from state 
postconviction. A federal defender who represents clients in capital 
cases said her office would return to state court to exhaust state 
postconviction remedies but would not file a cert petition at that 
stage; she also explained they would return to federal court after 
exhausting state claims and would seek cert from the judgment of 
the United States courts of appeal.
These remarks provide some insight into the structural forces 
that may make filing a petition for a writ of certiorari from state 
postconviction seem less worthwhile than seeking cert after federal 
habeas (even in the absence of a statutory bar). Defenders may feel 
pressure to focus resources on filing a federal habeas petition rather 
than on filing a petition for a writ of certiorari from a judgment of 
state postconviction. These pressures may be exacerbated by the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Florida that the 
filing of a cert petition from a state postconviction proceeding does 
not toll the one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas 
petition under AEDPA.211 The Lawrence Court also recognized that 
a prisoner is not required to file a cert petition to “exhaust state 
remedies.”212 
Thus, assuming a low grant rate and limited resources, there is 
little incentive for defenders to file cert petitions at the state 
postconviction stage. Of course, one potentially under-appreciated 
reason for filing a cert petition at the state postconviction stage is 
that—for the reasons we discuss in this paper—the Supreme Court 
will be able to review de novo the merits of the federal constitutional 
issue.
211. 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1081 (2007). 
212. Id. at 1083. 
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B. Provision of Counsel to State Prisoners Seeking Certiorari 
We were particularly interested in structural barriers to the filing 
of cert petitions—statutory bars, prohibitive policies, or lack of 
resources. 213 The Supreme Court has concluded that the federal 
Constitution does not require states to provide representation to 
indigent defendants at the cert stage.214 One noted criminal law 
commentator—citing only the Supreme Court decision that 
appointed counsel is not obligated to file a frivolous petition—has 
written that “[although] the Supreme Court does not provide 
counsel for defendants preparing petitions for certiorari ... state and 
federal public defenders generally carry through their representa­
tion to include the certiorari petition where warranted.”215 Although 
this may be true in the federal system, our research suggests it is 
far from universally true for state public defenders. The gap in 
appointed counsel may explain the difference in filing rates out of 
state and federal court. 
In the federal system, the Criminal Justice Act requires the filing 
of nonfrivolous cert petitions by appointed counsel.216 Some state 
and local jurisdictions—such as the District of Columbia—also 
guarantee appointed counsel at the certiorari stage for meritorious 
213. In 1963, no less an authority than Professor Bator conceded that one troublesome 
argument for robust review of state prisoners’ federal claims in federal habeas was that the 
poor quality of state prisoners’ cert petitions—“drafted usually without a lawyer” and often 
accompanied by an incomplete record—impeded adequate Supreme Court “supervision of the 
state courts’ adjudication” and, if not addressed, “damage[d] the purposes served by the 
certiorari jurisdiction itself.” Bator, supra note 34, at 520-21. 
214. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617 (1974); see Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 
(2005). 
215. LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING & KERR, 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2 (3d ed. 2007). 
216. See Wilkins v. United States, 441 U.S. 468, 469 (1979) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A 
(1976)). But see Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5, 8 (1994) (noting that counsel appointed 
under the federal Criminal Justice Act are not required to file frivolous cert petitions).
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petitions.217 Others have promulgated standards for appointed 
appellate counsel that contemplate cert-stage representation.218 
As demonstrated by our survey,219 however, some jurisdictions 
do not provide counsel to file cert petitions220 or do not provide 
counsel for seeking cert from judgments of state postconviction 
proceedings.221 Indeed, some jurisdictions do not even recognize a 
statutory entitlement to counsel for the filing of petitions for 
discretionary review at the highest state court,222 thereby creating 
217. See Williams v. United States, 783 A.2d 598, 603 (D.C. 2001) (citing Qualls v. United 
States, 718 A.2d 1039, 1040 (D.C. 1998)); Corley v. United States, 416 A.2d 713, 714 (D.C. 
1980) (interpreting D.C. Code § 11-2601 et seq.). The State of Nevada recently joined this 
group when the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order detailing the responsibilities of 
counsel for indigent defendants, including the filing of petitions for certiorari in all capital 
cases and in criminal appeals when “warranted.” See In the Matter of the Review of Issues 
Concerning Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal and Juvenile Delinquency 
Cases, ADKT 411 Exhibit A, at 18, 23 (2008) (Standard 19(d) for capital counsel and Standard 
8(c) for appellate counsel), available at http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/documents/orders/ 
ADKT411Order.pdf. 
218. See Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services, Performance Standards 
Governing the Representation of Clients on Criminal Appeals and Post-Conviction Matters, 
¶ 20 (“In the event that the client’s appeal is unsuccessful, the appellate defender shall have 
the discretion, upon the request of the client and subject to the approval of the Chief Counsel 
or the Chief Counsel’s designee, to seek relief from the client’s conviction by petition for writ 
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court ... when in the best judgment of the appellate 
defender there exists a reasonable possibility that such relief may be obtained.”); New Mexico 
Public Defender Department, Performance Guidelines for Appellate Criminal Defense 
Representation, Guideline 2.1(g) (2000), available in 4 COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR 
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS (2000) (“The Appellate Defender, with the approval of the Chief 
Public Defender, shall have the discretion to seek review of any state court conviction in the 
United States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.”). 
219. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. 16 § 9960.6 (2007) (providing for the appointment of counsel 
in Pennsylvania Supreme Court appeals and “postconviction hearings, including proceedings 
at the trial and appellate levels,” and “[i]n any other situations were representation is 
constitutionally required,” but not for representation in discretionary appeals). 
220. See Strozier v. Hopper, 216 S.E.2d 847, 850 (Ga. 1975) (“[C]ounsel appointed by the 
State to represent an indigent has discharged his and the State’s duty when the right of 
review by means of appeal within the State system has been completed.”); State v. Harrison, 
18 P.3d 890, 894 (Haw. 2001) (declining to authorize attorneys’ fees and costs for appointed 
counsel for preparation of a cert petition to the U.S. Supreme Court). 
221. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.100(c)(2) (2007) (“[A]n indigent person is not entitled 
to representation ... for purposes of bringing ... a petition for review or certiorari from an 
appellate court ruling on an application for post-conviction relief ....).”
222. See, e.g., id.; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-203 (2007) (“Appointed counsel is required to 
represent the defendant only through the initial appellate review and is not required to 
pursue the matter through a second tier discretionary appeal by applying to the supreme 
court for a writ of certiorari.”); State v. Mata, 730 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Neb. 2007) (concluding 
that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to timely file a petition for review with 
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the situation that federal law claims may be procedurally defaulted 
in federal habeas.223 
Jurisdictions may be more generous in providing counsel to 
capital litigants at the certiorari stage.224 The vast majority of 
jurisdictions in which the death penalty is imposed provide post-
conviction counsel for capital defendants,225 presumably increasing 
the odds that a cert petition will be filed at the postconviction stages 
in capital cases (assuming that counsel are also compensated for 
doing cert petitions).226 However, a few jurisdictions—most notably 
the Nebraska Supreme Court); Harris v. State, 704 So.2d 1286 (Miss. 1997), abrogated on 
other grounds, Jackson v. State, 732 So.2d 187, 190 (Miss. 1999) (concluding that Mississippi 
statute does not require appointment of counsel to seek certiorari in noncapital case from 
state supreme court); Peterson v. Jones, 894 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“There 
is nothing in the language of either Article 26.05(a)(3) or Article 1.051(d)(2) to indicate the 
Legislature intended for the appointment or compensation of counsel to file a petition for 
discretionary review.”); BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE: CRIMINAL LAW § 75.10 (2007) (“In 1994 the 
Ohio Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to counsel on appeal extends only to the 
first appeal of right, and there is no right to counsel on a second appeal to the Supreme 
Court.” (citing State v. Buell, 639 N.E.2d 110 (Ohio 1994)). Contra Kargus v. State, 162 P.3d 
818, 824 (Kan. 2007) (recognizing the right to representation on discretionary appeal). 
223. See, e.g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-40 (1999) (holding that the failure 
to present claims to highest state court in petition for discretionary review resulted in 
procedural default of those claims in federal habeas proceedings). 
224. See American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Feb. 2003), Guideline 1.1, Definitional Note 5 
(defining scope of representation to encompass seeking certiorari both from direct appeal 
track and from postconviction review tract), 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 919 (2003); see In re 
Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 131 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (“We believe that it will protect the 
interests of defendants and promote the cause of justice for this court to appoint counsel to 
represent indigent defendants in capital cases in the following proceedings undertaken 
between the termination of their state appeals and their execution: ... Proceedings for 
appellate or other postconviction review of state court judgments in the United States 
Supreme Court ....”); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 15421 (West 2008) (authorizing the state 
public defender to represent defendants in automatic appeals in death cases in the filing of 
a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and to represent 
defendants in appeals in noncapital matters as long as it is fulfilling its responsibilities to 
capital defendants, or it determines that taking a limited number of noncapital cases is 
necessary for staff training); B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, 1 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 
§ 31 (3d ed. 2006) (“No change was compelled [by the Douglas rule] in the existing California 
practice of selective appointment of counsel to represent defendants on petitions for hearing 
in the Supreme Court and on applications for extraordinary writs.”). 
225. See Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State 
Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1086-87 (2006) (finding that 
“thirty-three of the thirty-seven death penalty states” appoint “defense counsel in capital 
postconviction proceedings,” although only “fourteen of those thirty-three states recognize a 
state statutory or constitutional right to have the appointed counsel be effective”). 
226. A federal statute guarantees counsel in § 2254 federal habeas proceedings for state 
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Alabama—currently fail to provide comprehensive legal counsel to 
capital defendants in state postconviction proceedings,227 claiming 
this state of affairs is justified by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Murray v. Giarratano.228 
The spotty provision of counsel at the certiorari stage mirrors the 
uneven provision of counsel for indigent defendants generally. 
Professional organizations such as the NLADA have published 
standards for appellate counsel relating to the decision whether to 
seek discretionary review.229 Nonetheless, in too many jurisdictions 
the appointed counsel system has gaps or is poorly funded,230 and 
such standards have little chance of being met. In 2004, the ABA 
reported that, although “[national] standards recommend that 
counsel be provided at every stage of the proceedings, including 
sentencing, appeal, certiorari, and postconviction review,” reality 
did not meet that aspiration in many American jurisdictions.231 
Moreover, it may be difficult to document all of the factors that 
discourage the filing of cert petitions from state courts. State 
statutes and decisional law regarding the appointment of counsel 
death row inmates. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2006). 
227. See Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1232 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e too recognize the 
logic in the argument that there simply are not enough volunteer lawyers willing to undertake 
a full review and investigation of a case in order to initiate postconviction proceedings on 
behalf of a death-sentenced inmate. If we lived in a perfect world, which we do not, we would 
like to see the inmates obtain the relief they seek in this case. However, we are bound by 
United States Supreme Court precedent, as well as our own precedent, which clearly establish 
that the United States Constitution does not afford appointed counsel on collateral review.”); 
see also Freedman, supra note 225, at 1089-90 (explaining that Alabama “has no system at 
all for providing prefiling assistance to capital prisoners wishing to pursue postconviction 
actions, known locally as Rule 32 proceedings”) (footnote omitted). 
228. 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (providing fifth vote in upholding 
Virginia scheme for furnishing postconviction counsel to death row inmates, Justice Kennedy 
emphasized that “[t]he requirement of meaningful access can be satisfied in various ways ....”). 
But see Freedman, supra note 225, at 1089 (“Giarratano did not decide that there is no right 
to counsel in state postconviction proceedings in capital cases. Rather, Giarratano only 
rejected the claim of constitutional entitlement in that particular instance, and implicitly held 
that other facts would lead to other results.” (citation omitted)). 
229. See NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS AND EVALUATION 
DESIGN FOR APPELLATE DEFENDER OFFICES § I (N) (1980), available at http://www.nlada.org/ 
Defender/Defender_Standards/Standards_For_Appellate_Defender_Offices. 
230. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 188, at 8-14. In November 2007, New York 
State was sued for alleged constitutional shortcomings in its indigent defense system. See 
Anthony Ramirez, Suit by Civil Liberties Group Presses State on Legal Services for the 
Indigent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at B5. 
231. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 188, at 22. 
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do not tell the whole story. Office policies and custom, the attitudes 
of courts that appoint counsel, and local standards of practice all 
contribute to the availability of appointed counsel at the cert stage. 
Trial courts may deny funds for appointed counsel to file cert peti­
tions, even if attorneys are entitled to compensation.232 Logistical 
problems with the appointment of counsel—such as delays—may 
impede counsel’s ability to provide quality representation.233 
Lawyers may succumb to caseload pressure and too readily file the 
equivalent of Anders briefs.234 Or appointed counsel may simply 
inform unsuccessful appellants—as one New York treatise advises 
—that they have ninety days to file a petition for a writ of certiorari 
with the Supreme Court235—a de facto, if unstated, evaluation that 
the petition is not sufficiently meritorious for the involvement of 
counsel. 
Indeed, the cultural gap between local criminal practice and 
Supreme Court practice may be the greatest barrier to the filing of 
cert petitions. When asked about their cert practices, some dedi­
cated state public defenders readily admit they are not familiar 
with federal practice, let alone Supreme Court practice. Others 
acknowledge that—given resource constraints and the perceived low 
likelihood of success—cert petitions are simply not a high priority. 
In sum, it is far from clear that counsel is consistently available 
to file cert petitions on behalf of criminal defendants in state court, 
232. See State v. Green, 620 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1993) (overturning trial court’s denial of funds 
for appointed counsel to petition for a writ of certiorari, based on the equal protection and 
equal access to the courts provisions of the Florida Constitution). 
233. See, e.g., State v. Hodges, 671 P.2d 1051, 1059 n.1 (Idaho 1983) (Bistline, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As the LePage file in the clerk’s office shows, 
following his conviction, LePage, without counsel and indigent, endeavored to obtain 
appointment of counsel to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. By the time this Court 
caused counsel to be appointed, his allotted time had expired. Nevertheless, appointed counsel 
did so petition, but the petition was denied without comment leaving unknown whether 
untimeliness was the reason.”). 
234. Cf. Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5, 7 (1994) (noting that attorneys felt bound to 
file frivolous claims); Qualls v. United States, 718 A.2d 1039 (D.C. 1998) (adopting Anders-like 
provision for D.C.). 
235. GARY MULDOON, HANDLING A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW YORK § 23:111 (2007) (“If leave 
to appeal is denied, defense counsel should advise the client of the right to seek a writ of 
certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court. The application for a writ must be filed within 90 
days of denial of leave to appeal by the Court of Appeals. SUP. CT. R. 13. Only about 100 cases 
a year are accepted for argument by the United States Supreme Court. www.supreme 
courtus.gov. Four justices must agree in order for a writ of certiorari to be granted.”). 
     
             
             
    
            
     
           
             
               
             
   
       
          
             
        
          
        
       
       
       
          
        
         
           
       
         
       
           
            
      
          
        
     
         
         
         
       
       
262 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:211 
especially indigent criminal defendants.236 When counsel is avail­
able, it is not clear whether defense attorneys are filing cert 
petitions in cases in which they are merited. In light of the fact that 
the development of federal constitutional law depends even more 
heavily on cert petitions from judgments of state courts—as the four 
dissenting justices pointed out in Lawrence237—this gap in the 
provision of representation could have significant long-term con­
sequences for the development of criminal constitutional doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
Unless AEDPA is amended, the indigent criminal defense 
community and its allies should think hard about how to focus 
renewed attention on seeking certiorari from state court judgments. 
The Court appears increasingly disposed to grant certiorari in such 
cases. And it is in this procedural posture that state prisoners’ cases 
will receive the least deferential, non-AEDPA-restricted review by 
a federal court. For criminal defendants with claims that may 
require an extension—even if modest—of existing Supreme Court 
precedent, the likelihood of success on the merits will be better on 
a grant of cert from state court than on federal habeas review under 
AEDPA. From a systemic perspective, emerging constitutional 
issues will be permitted to develop.238 This paper is an initial 
attempt to understand current cert-seeking practices so they may 
be augmented and targeted most effectively. 
We believe our results counsel in favor of rethinking common 
defense practice with respect to certiorari filings from state criminal 
proceedings. In general, with respect to both direct appeals and 
postconviction proceedings, certiorari from state proceedings will be 
the only opportunity for non-AEDPA-constrained review by the 
236. The lack of appointed counsel at the certiorari stage may reduce the likelihood of pro 
bono help, because elite practitioners sometimes get involved after a cert petition is filed, or 
even after cert is granted. 
237. 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1089 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joining in Ginsburg’s 
dissent were Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer). 
238. One example of rapid doctrinal development driven largely by certiorari grants from 
state-court judgments is the Court’s recent expansion of the jury trial right beginning with 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and continuing with Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Cunningham v. California, 127 
S. Ct. 856 (2007). 
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Supreme Court—or any federal court. This is the moment for 
counsel to think systemically and to argue for development of the 
law. State court doctrine may be developing in a way that deviates 
from the likely trajectory of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Although 
state court proceedings often tend to focus on local precedent, this 
is the time for counsel to look outside the borders of her jurisdiction, 
and to conduct nationwide research to identify jurisdictional splits. 
239 240 Atkins v. Virginia, Crawford v. Washington, Blakely v. Washing­
241 242 ton, and Holmes v. South Carolina, are all excellent examples 
of positive doctrinal development arising from direct state appeals. 
There is even more need for a revolution in state postconviction 
certiorari practice. State postconviction counsel often focuses on 
preparing for federal habeas—exhausting claims,243 creating a 
factual record,244 and avoiding procedural default.245 Instead of 
viewing certiorari filings as a throwaway—a prelude to or distrac­
tion from the upcoming federal habeas—practitioners should 
recognize that certiorari from state postconviction proceedings may 
be their client’s last opportunity to receive non-AEDPA-constrained 
review of federal law issues. Rather than focusing solely on 
technical or procedural issues relating to habeas litigation, counsel 
should think hard about raising substantive constitutional issues 
that push the envelope.246 For example, Roper v. Simmons resulted 
in dramatic doctrinal development on certiorari from state 
postconviction proceedings.247 And as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in 
239. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
240. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
241. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
242. 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
243. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring exhaustion of available state remedies). 
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000) (prohibiting federal district courts from conducting 
evidentiary hearings in habeas cases where the petitioner “failed to develop the factual basis 
of a claim in State court proceedings”). 
245. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
246. As Professor Ty Alper pointed out to us, filing for certiorari from state postconviction 
may not always be intuitive, given state courts’ tendency to issue “post-card” denials of state 
habeas appeals. However, state courts cannot evade federal review by refusing to give fulsome 
consideration to an issue that has been presented to them. See STERN, GRESSMAN & SHAPIRO, 
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 150-51 (6th ed. 1986).
247. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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Lawrence248 suggests, four justices are attuned to the heightened 
importance of certiorari to judgments from state postconviction. 
At a systemic level, at least two types of initiatives could be 
pursued to increase the quality and effectiveness of meritorious cert 
petitions from judgments of state courts. The first category of efforts 
would support the local criminal defense bar. Simply put, resources 
must be made available to permit criminal practitioners in state 
courts to file more and better cert petitions, so that cert filings 
are more representative of the criminal cases litigated nationally. 
To that end, local jurisdictions, professional organizations, and 
private firms must support criminal practitioners. Forms of mate­
rial support could include increasing funding for local criminal 
defense programs, instituting office policies regarding certiorari 
seeking, and developing training programs on certiorari practice.
The second type of initiative falls on elite practitioners. Experi­
enced Supreme Court practitioners, firms with access to Supreme 
Court expertise, and law school clinics should increase their pro 
bono commitments and should refocus their efforts to place greater 
emphasis on identifying “cert-worthy” state court criminal cases. 
The path of least resistance appears to be to identify circuit splits in 
federal prisoners’ cases or to focus all pro bono efforts on (admittedly 
compelling) death penalty cases in the final stages of federal habeas. 
For all the reasons we have discussed, however, after AEDPA, 
development of federal constitutional criminal doctrine in state 
prisoners’ cases will occur only on writ of certiorari from judgments 
of state courts.
A related challenge for the Supreme Court bar is to work more 
effectively with local criminal practitioners. Offers of help might be 
met with a warmer reception if accompanied by sustained pro bono 
assistance and efforts to build capacity within the local bar. While 
Supreme Court practitioners tend to view themselves as forum 
experts who can learn any subject matter, those who demonstrate 
a continued commitment to criminal issues may have greater 
success in developing relationships within the indigent defense 
community.249 
248. 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1086 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
249. For example, Donald Verrilli of Jenner & Block has argued three recent major 
criminal cases. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007); Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 
573 (2006); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
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Thirty years ago, Cover and Aleinikoff wrote of the benefits of a 
“dialogue” between state and federal courts regarding federal 
constitutional issues.250 Through escalating limitations on federal 
habeas, culminating in AEDPA’s “as determined by the Supreme 
Court” provision, that dialogue has been shut down.
We believe a new dialogue can emerge as an engine for doctrinal 
development. Like the pre-AEDPA dialogue, the post-AEDPA 
dialogue will be “polycentric” in character and will “demonstrate a 
remarkable breadth of views and concerns.”251 But the post-AEDPA 
dialogue will not be principally between state and lower federal 
courts. Federal courts will continue to play a role in doctrinal 
development,252 but in the post-AEDPA world it can no longer be 
said that state and federal courts must “speak and listen as 
equals,”253 with respect to state prisoners’ criminal cases. Whereas 
state courts “felt no need to converse with other state courts” in the 
pre-AEDPA dialogue,254 the new dialogue—if it is to emerge—will 
increasingly feature conversations among state courts.
To invigorate this new dialogue, criminal defense practitioners 
and their allies must think carefully about how to build a vital 
practice of seeking certiorari from judgments of state courts. We 
hope this Article sparks recognition of the existence of a certiorari 
filing gap for state prisoners and initiates a discussion of how to 
begin closing this gap. 
250. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1036. 
251. Id. at 1065. 
252. See supra Part III.A. 
253. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1036. 
254. Id. at 1064-65 (“[T]he state cases ... consistently canvassed and considered leading 
federal cases .... It is far less common to see a sister state case cited.”). 
